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ABSTRACT
This project addresses the problem of an “ocularcentric” bias in philosophy, with
a focus on phenomenological and continental thought. Being a blind phenomenologist, I
noticed an ocularcentric tendency dominating philosophers’ perspectives, including their
arguments, use of metaphors, and choices of examples. As a blind reader, I found that
such ocularcentrism prevented me from understanding their claims. This made me
wonder whether ocularcentric biases might be leading them to unbalanced or invalid
arguments and world-views. The questions raised are: Can there be philosophy that is not
reliant on vision above all other senses? Is it possible for philosophy to not be grounded
at its core in vision and visual concepts?
In my project, I examine the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel
Levinas to determine if it is possible to philosophize from a non-ocularcentric
perspective. As part of my project, I examine a trend in continental thought towards what
Martin Jay calls “anti-ocularcentrism.” While I find many of his insights quite valuable, I
conclude that the “anti-ocular” cases examined by Jay are not ultimately free of
ocularcentrism, nor do they provide a sound alternative to it. As long as vision (or its
opposite, blindness) remains a core part of a philosophical world-view, it remains
ocularcentric at its core.

ii

I find in the works of Merleau-Ponty tantalizing philosophical arguments
suggesting a potential alternative. In his emphasis on all five senses, including full
embodiment of the perceiving subject, Merleau-Ponty can be seen as presenting an
alternative to the ocularcentric perspective. In the end, though, his arguments prove
unsatisfactory and remain ocularcentric. It is only when we turn to Levinas that we find a
true break from ocularcentrism. Offering an “alternative metaphysical vision,” his ethics
is founded on relation to the Other as a metaphysical reality beyond comprehension,
beyond experiencing with the senses, and beyond definition. Vision, in this case, does not
reveal truth. Using the work of Levinas, one can arrive at a philosophical perspective that
is not reliant on vision. With Levinas, we find that it is possible to philosophize from a
truly anti-ocularcentric perspective.
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PREFACE
For nearly all of its history, Western philosophy suffers from being
metaphysically imbalanced: since its beginning all the way until the 20th century,
philosophy favored the visual faculty above the other senses. Philosophy is usually
written from the perspective of ocularcentrism and as such is slanted heavily in favor of
the sense of sight as a means to arrive at philosophical truths. Visual metaphors have also
often been resorted to in order to more clearly explicate propositions or make conclusive
statements about reality or human existence. Plato’s Cave immediately comes to mind as
the most obvious historical case in point. There are equally prominent examples where a
lack of vision, darkness, or blindness are used as both a metaphor and as a contrasting
statement to clarify the experiential state of perceiving. For philosophers working with
perception, and studying Phenomenology, the most obvious experiences they reach for to
help explicate reality are those experiences most commonly presented to human beings:
visual perceptions.
If one knows by seeing, and equates seeing with knowing, what is seen and
known? Who is it that knows? Phenomenology deals with questions of pure
consciousness using the perceptual experiences of the perceiver as the beginning of the
analysis. Phenomenologists usually try to describe a given perceptual experience (almost
always a visual perspective) in a neutral way in the hope of discovering the essence of
1

consciousness, or discovering and describing the nature and boundaries of Being.
Ontology asks: What is it? Or, as often, phenomenological ontology asks: Who is it?
Who perceives? The thinker may even go so far as to ask: What am I? What is my being?
What is my role? What is my purpose? I will attempt to answer these questions.
From the perspective of a blind philosophy student, I could not help feeling
alienated as a result of this analytical error and found myself deeply frustrated with
Phenomenology’s heavy slant in favor of the visual. I found that such a slant prevented
me from easily identifying with or even understanding various works of philosophy, in
addition to the expected difficulties and complexities of the problems and proposed
solutions put forward by each Phenomenologist in question. But, this study should not be
confused with an emotionally driven rant against ocularcentrism, or with a call for equal
rights or inclusive excellence in the voices of philosophers. It could be that my arguments
will actually imply such things, but even though the genesis of this project arose from my
frustration with visual descriptions that were impenetrable to me, it is a theoretical
critique, not a personal one based on personal feelings.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas appear to offer a sound
alternative to a visually-slanted discourse. Both thinkers offer a phenomenology. For
Levinas, this is less so in terms of phenomenology, since he does not follow the trends
and tendencies of mainstream Phenomenology or Continental thought. Merleau-Ponty
appears to take a step away from that binary discourse by studying full embodiment as an
ontological state, including all the senses and constitution of a person’s perceptions, and
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later by decentralizing the viewer completely. For Merleau-Ponty, however,
phenomenological ontology remains his starting point.
Emmanuel Levinas, on the other hand, proposes an alternative entirely outside the
standard discourse of ontology, arguing instead in favor of an Ethical Metaphysics which
places at its core my relation with alterity. Through demonstrating that “I” am responsible
for “the other,” I am not constituted of myself as an individual operating in a world of
other individuals to fulfill selfish ends, but rather, “I” am entangled with and inextricably
connected to “the other” and grounded in a demand to fulfill my responsibilities to him or
her. This arrangement is a fact of reality (or, more to the point, it is a ground beyond
mere facts), and is not a lawful or behavior-based set of principles that we enact from a
list of prohibitions. The other demands of me whether I am aware of it or not, and that
relation is what constitutes me. This metaphysical system does not require ontology. It is
a move to a higher metaphysics. Levinas’ metaphysical system, while still allowing that
the individual’s perceptions must be a starting point and a subject for study, places the
needs, reality, and call of the other at its foundation.
Martin Jay outlines a trend against ocular-centric discourse in twentieth century
phenomenology – a trend which runs seemingly counter to the great bulk of philosophy’s
history. Naturally, human beings see and human nature also leads us to grasp at those
perceptual descriptions and metaphors that feel closest or most important to
understanding what is real. But, in contrast to history, Martin Jay saw modern
phenomenological thought swinging against that long-term ocular-centric trend. French
thinkers lead the charge and, throughout the twentieth century in phenomenological or
3

Continental discourse, they have ruthlessly attacked visual supremacy. They completely
reject it in favor of linguistic, or blindness-based, metaphors.
The attack began, according to Martin Jay’s analysis, near the end of the
nineteenth century, first in the work of Henri Bergson, and later throughout the works of
those French Phenomenologists and cultural theorists who followed him. Today, it could
be argued that Phenomenology stands divided between two polarities: either ocularcentric and visual in its approach to Phenomenology or critical theory, or anti-ocularcentric, which substitutes blindness, or darkness, as the primary focus of its explication.
Those opposed to ocular-centric discourse are still caught within it. The denigration of
ocular-centric discourse failed to clarify the work of Phenomenologists and, although
they attacked the problem, the attackers offered no solution or suitable alternative to it.
I said above that Levinas presents us with an alternative Phenomenological
viewpoint. He still uses certain aspects of phenomenological analysis, but, according to
its nature, alterity cannot be experienced such that one can analyze it, or define it,
according to a list of philosophical terms. In order for Phenomenological analysis to be
valid, it should be complete and include the best description of experiences possible. In
this case, I suggest that excluding the other senses, and arguing that disabled people have
an incomplete phenomenological field of experience, reflects back on a greater flaw in
general. Ontology requires vision. Rearranging the senses so that another one of them is
superior is not an alternative, but is simply a reconstructed version suffering from the
same errors of emphasis and imbalance. When Levinas critiques Heidegger’s concept of
Being, he demonstrates that Heidegger left out a vastly important set of factors that have
4

an effect on the individual perceiver and on that person’s reality. The clearest way that I
can demonstrate that Phenomenologists have erred is to show how they use visual
perceptions as complete truths. There are, no doubt, any number of approaches one may
utilize to critique Phenomenologists that would be equally valid. I propose to present
through the works of Levinas an alternative discourse (or an alternative
Phenomenological metaphysics) that escapes both the confines of the visual and the
potentially the currently existing limits of a Phenomenology that rules out the disabled
person’s perspective. It is assumed that this perspective is a full expression of
metaphysical exploration.
Since philosophers like Merleau-Ponty or Levinas do not directly answer inquiries
such as the one I am considering, I extract the answer through their ontologies,
metaphysics, and arguments to create a stronger alternative to ocular-centric
Phenomenology. Ocularcentrism is not just a tendency in phenomenology that I disagree
with. It actually does limit a phenomenologist’s creativity and understanding.
The layout of this project is fairly simple. The first chapter will be devoted to an
introduction to phenomenology, what it is, along with its various interpretations. The
second chapter will trace the development of ocularcentric discourse and the opposing socalled anti-ocularcentric currents in 20th century thought. The third chapter will discuss
the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and demonstrate both how his work is and is not a
unique step away from ocularcentrism. I will discuss in that chapter how his work both
favors the phenomenological experiences of disabled people, and classifies such
phenomenological experiences as inferior to those of able-bodied people. The fourth
5

chapter will concentrate on the work of Emmanuel Levinas. I will show how and why his
thought offers a conclusive escape and alternative to ontology and, as such, frees us from
the limits of ocularcentric discourse. It is from his work that I construct a potential path
of escape from ocularcentrism. The fifth chapter presents my closing thoughts,
observations, and conclusions concerning this topic. Throughout, I will discuss the
implications of the works of these thinkers and the potential avenues they offer for a fresh
engagement with phenomenology, or with metaphysics as we understand it.
Starting Word on Blindness and the Construction of this Document
Due to the fact that I am totally blind while writing this dissertation, I am using
unique technologies in a novel way. As a result, there are some anomalies in this work
that one would not see in the work of a fully sighted doctoral candidate writing a
dissertation. I am using a screen reader to read electronic copies of the books that I need.
The books are scanned using OCR software, like photocopying, and converted into either
PDFs, or into text files that the computer can read back to me as speech. To augment my
typing, which I am not terribly good at, I am also using speech-to-text dictation software.
All of these measures are designed to speed up the process of composition. As a result,
some of the words that I dictate, the computer misprints or mishears. The opposite is also
true. Sometimes the computer will read words to me and unless I go through them one
letter at a time, I may misunderstand what that word is.
Furthermore, I am unusually limited in the sources that I draw from. The process
of converting a print book into a text file that I can use may take several weeks. The
scans do not always come out accurately. Even more difficult, some of the books that I
6

draw from do not have the page numbers from the original printed version in the
electronic file. This can be for a number of reasons. I do not have software that makes
footnotes easy to compose and organize. I do it all by hand. As a result, some of the
parentheticals that are used do not have page numbers. At this point in the composition of
the text, I am not using numbers of the footnotes in brackets. I am not able to write all of
my notes, organize them on note cards, paste them to the wall and look up at them, etc. I
do it all by listening. It is true that I am used to reading electronic books by listening to
them and have become exceptionally good at it. I can read far faster than the average
sighted reader. Yet, a subject like this that is difficult and obscure, forces me to slow
down my screen reader considerably. All this having been said, I point this out as the first
demonstration to the reader of how blindness effects and changes the common everyday
experiences we all have. The very composition of this document is a much different
experience both intellectually and phenomenologically than it usually is for sighted
students. If it is the case in the mere composition of this work that there are so many
differences between my experience in composing it and that of sighted persons, imagine a
comparison of one’s phenomenological experiences and phenomenological world. The
question of what we perceive is, ontologically, a deeply important question.

7

CHAPTER 1: WHAT IS PHENOMENOLOGY?
In this chapter, my intention is to give a basic survey of the main ideas in
phenomenology and highlight the salient points of change as the movement evolved
between 1901, the time of its founding, to the 1960s and 70s, when Emmanuel Levinas
arrived on the Continental philosophical stage. Within this survey, I seek to place Levinas
and Merleau-Ponty in context, and plan to highlight the essential elements that shape
phenomenology through the mid-20th century.
Phenomenology structures consciousness from a first person perspective, as
experienced by that person, with special attention to experiencing objects within a
meaningful context, and establishing an “Intentional” relation between the individual and
the object.1 In this case, “Intentional,” or “Intentionality,” means the contextual and
emotional connection and contact that the object has for the person experiencing it. The
word “intentionality” or “intention” does not mean plan, goal, or purpose.
Phenomenological language, although it uses many words we are familiar with in the
“natural” way we use them, has different meanings and different contexts for many of
those very same words.

“Phenomenology,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/.
1
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Phenomenology refers to the philosophical methodological discipline that
encompasses the description and characterization of qualities of emotional experiences as
they are being experienced. Phenomenology, in this sense, refers to the discipline of
philosophy that had its official beginning in 1901 with the work of Edmund Husserl.2
Although the philosophical movement was founded by Husserl, and its methodologies
initiated and interpreted by him, many of his followers did not agree with his
interpretations or methods, and deviated significantly from the original phenomenological
methods of the founder. Their outlook was still phenomenological. However, this gave
rise to a wide range of interpretations and practices, all of which have their foundation in
Husserl’s work.3
Phenomenology aims to evaluate and study perceptions as they are experienced
without interpretation or judgment following the technique of transcendental
phenomenological reduction proposed by Husserl. This approach was meant to instill
purity and objectivity in the phenomenologist. Many of Husserl’s followers had similar
ideals but broke away from the transcendental phenomenological reduction, deviating
dramatically from Husserl’s original intentions, although they may have inscribed
themselves in the continuity of his work.4 I will briefly discuss the key elements that
make phenomenology what it is. The current that I am most concerned with in this study
is what Martin Jay called “Ocularcentrism.” Put simply, this is the tendency for

2

Ibid.

3

Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), 2-3.

4

Ibid., 3.
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phenomenologists to favor visual experiences over all other sensory experiences,
including experiences of embodiment, self-consciousness, or time. I will argue Maurice
Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas – the two thinkers on whose works I am focusing
most deeply – helped clear the way for, or entirely broke free from, ocularcentrism. In the
case of Levinas, he broke free even from ontology itself.
We can all agree that we share more or less the same sensory experiences and live
as embodied beings in the same world. We share a physical world and its rules apply
across all human experience. The laws of physics are proof enough that reality consists of
a physical world and our experiences in the world, along with our natural assumptions,
are all true and correct.5 What may or may not be real is the idea that the body is operated
like a machine, and by an embodied separate creature that drives it. This being is separate
from, but not outside of, the physical body. The soul, whether we mean it in the Cartesian
sense or the modern psychological sense, is not corrupted or affected by the body. So, the
soul has its own existence. The soul is the thinking portion of the human being. The fact
that the thoughts remain constant and separate from experience shows that there is
strength behind this theory. We live as if looking out upon the world through the eyes,
hearing through the ears, and smelling through the nose. The brain somehow interprets
for us what the world throws at us, and then we see or hear or feel what the brain gives
us. The mind, then, experiences apart from the brain what we perceive.

5

“Phenomenology,” Internet Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, http://www.iep.utm.edu/phenom/.
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According to Hubert Dreyfus, this idea is so embedded in our culture and our
psyche, that we are all “unconscious Cartesians” whether we profess to believe in the
separate soul or not. We are dualistic in our self-perception.6 It is to a great extent
entrenched in our religion, our psychology, and our philosophy. Those who do not
believe in such a thing as a soul might say that the brain constructs a picture, a copy of
that outside world and interprets it for us. It constructs it for us, like a virtual copy, and
that is how we experience the world. If you break parts of the brain that do the
interpreting, the interpretations become flawed, which is why diseases or injuries to the
brain lead to vision or hearing loss, the inability to feel, partial impairment of senses,
etc. If one is adept enough, one can analyze the mind’s interpretation of the outside
world. If one is careful and perceptive enough, one can separate the body from the mind.
This view, which Merleau-Ponty calls the “Intellectualist” point of view, requires more
consideration, as it is also held by modern thinkers.7
Not all thinkers hold to this dualistic understanding of the self. The
phenomenologists whose work I will explore in this project definitely do not. What
Merleau-Ponty thinks of as “embodiment” differs from what you or I might naturally
think of as embodiment. Unconsciously, we see “embodiment” as that term which
describes the way the soul dwells within and controls the body. The soul is embodied,
embedded in the body, and contained by it. One branch of Phenomenology, that of
Hubert Dreyfus, “Consciousness,” Recording, 8:35, 2005,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bhz7bRiuDk0.
6

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.,
1962), vii-xi.
7
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Husserl and after him Jean-Paul Sartre’s, holds to a similar idea of the separate soul (pure
consciousness). Another branch of Phenomenology, beginning with Martin Heidegger
through Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, does not.
Phenomena are those experiences we have in the world. What we see, hear, and
feel, are phenomena. Phenomenology, as a separate discipline, can be traced to Edmund
Husserl’s 1901 treatise, Logical Investigations, but the term had existed for at least a
hundred years prior to that as a philosophical concept. Arguably, doing Phenomenology
goes all the way back to the beginning of human thought – whenever people discuss and
analyze experience in the world. Edmund Husserl is given the credit for the creation of
phenomenology as a methodology of its own.8 Some of the techniques that compose
Phenomenology can also be credited to other thinkers in other sciences. Hegel used the
term Phenomenology in The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). Psychologists like William
James or Franz Brantano grappled with the elements of consciousness and the experience
of sensation. Immanuel Kant in his Third Critique wrote about an emotional response of
the individual to various experiences. But, it was Husserl who integrated, and, in some
cases, redefined these ideas and techniques in such a way as to create that methodology
which we now call phenomenology, a methodology that stands on its own, apart from
psychology or introspection.9

“Phenomenology,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/.
8

9

Ibid.
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Descartes is one of the primary enemies of phenomenologists. Husserl
dismissively characterized Descartes’ description of the soul, or that people have souls, as
merely replacing what we experience as the ego with the religious concept of soul.10
Although Husserl himself is, in a sense, a Cartesian, some passages suggest that he is as
much resistant to being classified as Cartesian as any other phenomenologist would be.
There is such a thing as pure consciousness for Husserl, but he sees phenomenology as a
new scientific philosophical methodology.11
The transcendental phenomenological reduction is the technique that Husserl
created that is supposed to separate the phenomenologist and his acceptance of his
experiences, since they are from someone who naturally interprets his or her experiences,
and assigns reasons and causes to the phenomena being experienced.12 The
transcendental phenomenological reduction is a tool that gives the phenomenologist the
ability to gain a neutral position from which to observe, accepting and describing the
phenomenon as it is experienced in itself without interpretation. The phenomenological
reduction enables us to experience the world as given, the givenness of the world, and its
pure form.13 The transcendental phenomenological reduction also allows for people to

Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1970), Section 18.
10

11

Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), 2-3.

12

“Phenomenology,” Internet Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, http://www.iep.utm.edu/phenom/.

13

Ibid.
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experience things as they are. These are things in themselves, and are without the
prejudices that might actually prevent one from describing the phenomenon as it is.
Komarine Romdenh-Romluc explains that a transcendental phenomenological
reduction is not a denial or negation of the natural or scientific world. Instead, it is a
suspension of all preconceived notions, allowing the experience to be had directly.14 Note
that, in-and-of itself, this step is not enough. One must also perform an eidetic
phenomenological reduction. In an eidetic reduction, one tries to imagine a given
experience without a certain quality. If the quality in question can be removed but does
not change the essential nature of the experience, then it is not essential to the experience.
If removing a given quality dramatically changes the experience, then it is essential for
that experience to be what it is. Romdenh-Romluc describes her dog: changing the color
of his paws would not make him less of a dog, but changing his paws would make him a
different creature.15 Many phenomenologists, including those I study in this work, could
not see performing a transcendental phenomenological reduction as being possible, and
largely moved away from that particular element of Husserl’s phenomenological
methodology.16
Although Phenomenology states that the self is part of the world – contextually it
is in the world – we still do have experiences that let us see ourselves as separate

Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, Merleau-Ponty and Phenomenology of Perception (London & New
York: Routledge, 2011), 7-8.
14

15

Ibid., 8.

16

Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), 161-62.
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individual selves, housed in, but apart from, our bodies, and having a separate ethereal
soul. We are all unconscious Cartesians whether we like it or not. Husserl and Sartre
were also Cartesians; their phenomenology built around both the Cartesian premise and a
neo-Kantian concept of reason interacting with concepts apart from the body, and the
world in which it dwells.17 On the other hand, beginning with Martin Heidegger,
phenomenologists see the body and the self as being part of the world. You cannot say a
person moves out into the world since he or she is already embedded in it, and is open to
its influences in mood, in thought, and in relation to it. As a person copes with the world,
attempting to get a maximum grip on it in order to achieve an important task, the person
and the world are not apart or separated from each other. We are, as Merleau-Ponty goes
on to emphasize, embodied beings. We cannot evaluate our consciousness as if it were
separate from the body, as if there were a purified substance called primary
consciousness which, in its essence, is the root of all impressions, as posited by
Husserl.18 It is true that Merleau-Ponty tries to elucidate such states of consciousness that
are pre-thought (or pre-awareness) as one might have in an expert driver, or athlete, or
chess player. One eventually reaches a state wherein one is aware of, but not specifically
thinking about, what one is doing. It is merely done. Opportunity is recognized to carry
out a certain bodily activity and the body, being embedded in the world, allows for the
opportunity to engage with the world in a certain way.

17

Ibid., 11-12.

18

Ibid., 78.
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Below, I will speak less abstractly about the individual coping with the world, or
being open to it through the body. Equally, in Heidegger, when one is using a tool or
equipment for the purpose of completing a given task, one is not consciously thinking
about the tool, unless somehow the flow is interrupted, or the tool breaks for example.
The tool serves as the extension of the body, and one is unconscious of it as a separate
object. Now, at that point where a person is no longer able to cope with the world
because of some unforeseen interruption (say because of the tool’s breaking), then one
must think about how to solve the problem. One falls into a place where thoughts are
consciously experienced.19 Our inner narrative focuses on the problem. This is a reaction
to unusual breakage, or breakdown, against the individual.
Seemingly, to carry out the transcendental phenomenological reduction or the
additional eidetic reduction, a person must already have the knowledge of what the
essential elements are or are not in a given experience that defines it. The purpose of the
transcendental phenomenological reduction is to exclude pre-existing knowledge,
scientific or otherwise, or to escape preconceived interpretations of the experience that
one already has from one’s previous experiences. For instance, one already has to know
that if you change an essential element of a dog, it changes the creature. That is, if you
change a dog’s paws to hooves, you no longer have a dog in front of you. You already
have to know this. This suggests that carrying out the transcendental phenomenological

19

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row Publishers Inc., 1962), 98ff.
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reduction as Husserl describes is difficult, if not impossible.20 Perhaps that accounts for
why Heidegger arrived at a different view of how an individual is connected to the world
around him or her. One is already fully integrated into the world and experiencing the
world without needing to carry out a transcendental phenomenological reduction.
Heidegger takes the entire experience of “always already being in the world” and accepts
all its elements as part of the experience. One is already, as it were, inside, fully engulfed
in the experience. There is not a point at which you can stand outside the experience and
arbitrarily declare which elements may be excluded and which included. We are part of
the world, and the world is part of us. This is a concept that Merleau-Ponty will include
in his phenomenology, but with the important addition of emphasizing—in a way not
found in Heidegger—the human body and its connection to the world.
Being in the world includes behavior or one’s comportment, how one presents
and carries oneself in the world. For Heidegger, behaviors are often predetermined
according to the project or task one is determined to do or preassigned. In order to
accomplish a project, whatever the project may be, one needs to have access to the
correct tools. For Heidegger, the right tool is essential for the task to be completed. He
will often use the example of hammering. Suppose that someone is building something
with a hammer. They may have several different sized hammers available that they can
use. The tools are either “ready to hand” or “present at hand” for the worker. If the tool is
available but not necessarily in use, it is “present at hand.” If one is using it and it is the

20

Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), 228.
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correct tool for the job, then it is “ready to hand.” This is not as important as the idea that
when one is using the proper tool one is absorbed by the task and no longer aware of
swinging a hammer or aiming the hammer at the nail. You are absorbed fully by your
work and by the goal that you wish to achieve.21
Another example: composing this chapter. My tools are words. The right word to
convey the correct meaning simply communicates what I wish to convey and the word
loses its visibility to me. I am not thinking about the words anymore. One is doing such a
task “for the sake of” a greater purpose or role in life. Someone may be hammering for
the sake of building a house to dwell in. One dwells in houses for protection against the
elements. I am composing this chapter “for the sake of” getting a Ph.D. Getting a Ph.D.
will provide increased options for employment for me “for the sake” of being a greater
part of society. If one suddenly discovers that the tool being used is broken or one
attempts to use the wrong tool for the purpose of the job, then one becomes fully aware of
the task that one is doing in all of its nuances. The flow is broken, as it were. One then
becomes aware that one is hammering and each swing is carried out with certain motions.
The hammer is very heavy and hard to handle. If the hammer breaks, the disruption
causes a person to be completely caught up in the moment and disconnected from the
task. Aspects of this Heideggerian description of doing a project are important because
they will recur in a slightly altered form in the work of Merleau-Ponty, as we shall show
in Chapter 3.

21

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row Publishers Inc., 1962), 98-100.
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It would be reasonable to ask what exactly does this have to do with
ocularcentrism? For Heidegger, oftentimes truth is revealed to a person through one's
vision. Objects reveal themselves, or show themselves, to the person, and they shine in
the world. Metaphorically, when one suddenly has an insight or recognizes something
one did not understand before, that is as a clearing in the forest and the light shining in
the clearing. Heidegger does not exclude hearing, but clearly for Heidegger vision is the
preeminent sense. Additionally, it is important to recognize the place of vision as a skill
itself. Seeing is not something people do automatically because they are born with eyes
that function correctly. Seeing is a skill that they acquire and learn over time. It is an
embodied skill. I will demonstrate in chapter three how Merleau-Ponty defines seeing
and feeling as embodied skills. You become unaware that you are using your eyes and
you simply look at something and watch. If one sees something that one is mistaken
about and it takes a moment to more clearly recognize what is being looked at, one will
not necessarily remember the steps taken to arrive at the correct perception. The object
will be remembered as if always seen correctly, and never mistaken for anything else.
For Heidegger, embodiment and the other senses are less important than the
project one is engaged in, or the reasons motivating that project. Levinas points out that
“Dasein” (Heidegger’s name for human being) is never hungry, or cold, or happy.22
Everybody’s life is nothing but “the task,” what is set to be achieved, the essence of
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being. Personal "authenticity" is an important concept in Heidegger’s philosophy.23
“Authenticity” emerges when the person understands his or her destiny in the world and
surrenders to that destiny. In fact, you are most free when your decisions are all being
made for the sake of some higher purpose that seemingly determines your actions. There
are certain times when you act in accordance with the majority, with the many, or as
Heidegger called them the “They.” In this, you act the way one expects someone to act in
a given situation. If you read the newspaper about an outrageous story, you feel like the
average person. If you get a promotion at your job, they expect you to be happy and to
celebrate that promotion. In social situations, there are expected patterns of behavior that
all of them engage in.24 Whether one is engaged in authenticity, or is more in a state of
acting like the “They,” what one is not is an independent freethinking deciding being that
is separated from the world, with an ego separated from the body that thinks for itself and
is the origin of its own feelings.
Like every other phenomenologist who I will be talking about in this work,
Heidegger’s main target was Descartes and his ideas of mind-body dualism, namely that
the mind apart from the body in the world thinks of the world in the form of its own
mental representations that it has re-created. In other words, concepts do not exist in the
mind on their own, and the subject does not create the world. For Heidegger, one is open
to the world, not closed off from it. A person may seem to have a private stream of
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thought that is their own, or that seemingly belongs to them. But, oftentimes, one is
influenced by thoughts and expectations. A person is open to the mood and the
atmosphere of the world around them. You enter into a mood the way you may enter into
a cold room. Moods do not come from within.25 They are not created separately or
independently by you. One is already embedded in the atmosphere of the world, and
responds accordingly. A person exists in a state of being-in-the-world. While MerleauPonty extends this phenomenological concept, Levinas, we will see, more drastically
questions this fundamental identification of self in and through ontology.
Heidegger’s primary phenomenological focus and attention is to answer one most
basic question – that is, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” or “What is it?”
Most phenomenologists are engaging in ontology in one form or another. The clearest
way to interact with or register the presence of other things in the world is through one's
vision. Vision is an important element of ontology. Therefore, ocularcentrism is
supportive of ontology. Heidegger’s philosophy is steeped both metaphorically and
perceptually in visual concepts and visual metaphors. While Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis
on embodiment will help us move to a more balanced viewpoint, his work remains
ontological. Levinas’ break from ontology will decisively move beyond ocularcentrism.
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CHAPTER 2: WHAT IS OCULARCENTRISM?
In this chapter, I would like to take up the topic of ocularcentrism. I will be
primarily following the works of Martin Jay, drawing from other works as needed. His
concept of what ocularcentrism is, is the foundation for my critique of phenomenology,
but it should be pointed out that, although we agree in many cases, Jay's concept of what
constitutes true ocularcentrism disagrees with mine for several reasons. First of all, there
is a methodological differentiation between the ways in which we are both using the
term. Jay is a cultural theorist engaging in cultural critique and historiography, and who is
writing from the tradition of the Frankfurt School. He presents an intellectual history of
the concept as it developed across culture, in this case Continental philosophy that is
somewhat similar to mine. We have the same starting point. However, my concept is
based on the phenomenological methodology. For me, it is not enough for a thinker to be
saying that ocularcentrism is a negative thing. It is not enough that a thinker refutes
ocularcentrism simply by speaking of its opposite, or of, in a manner of speaking,
blinding the visual. Doing that feels like the other side of the ontological coin.
I will illustrate using a simple example from our day-to-day lives that I hope will
clarify my point. Hatred is not the opposite of love, since one can turn into the other.
They are closely related, but one wishes to benefit the loved one, while the other wishes
to harm her or him. Indifference truly opposes love. For me, truly engaging in anti22

ocularcentric discourse requires stepping out of the ocularcentric discourse entirely. It
means, engaging in a system that is not dependent or reliant on ocularcentric concepts to
express itself. That being the case, simply rejecting ocularcentrism with what at first
glance appears to be its opposite, does not constitute breaking free of ocularcentrism, or
of creating a useful or reasonable methodological differentiation that leads to a truly antiocularcentric system. Though I will be following Martin Jay’s concept of ocularcentrism,
we ultimately have different methodological perspectives, and different purposes in
critiquing ocularcentrism. I am therefore led to different outcomes than his. Keeping
those differences in mind, what is ocularcentrism, and, by extension, what is antiocularcentric discourse?
First of all, people see what they look at because of light. It seems very selfevident and obvious, but I needed to look up light since I have heard that sometimes
people can see beams of light. Yet, people cannot see light. I do not actually know what
seeing a beam of light would be like, so I felt the need to do some very basic Internet
research to find out exactly whether or not people see light. It turns out they cannot see
light, but can see dust particles or water droplets forming a beam of light. The human eye
cannot see light directly. Light lets people see the world around them, without being
visible itself. This is due to something called Maxwell's Equations, which demonstrate
that light photons do not bounce off of each other, or scatter off of each other. We only
see the objects we look at because light is reflected by those objects, and reaches our eyes
that interpret the wavelengths. The physical properties of photons or electromagnetic
waves are not strictly important to my inquiry, and, in any case, the agents did not
23

understand the physical properties of electromagnetic waves. They did, however,
recognize the transparency of light and had a number of optical theories that are largely
unimportant until we reach the work of Descartes.
As a brief aside, Cartesian dualism has very deep roots. According to Hans Jonas,
dualism, the separation of soul from matter, or of mind from body, had prevailed for
many hundreds of years.26 To the ancients, what we would strictly call matter was a
living substance. In this worldview, the unusual exception to the rule was death; opposite
of our modern scientific view, that life is the exception to death.27 To us, matter is largely
non-living. This non-living material is in some mysterious manner given life when taken
up by living organisms. It is common knowledge that many of the elements and metals in
the Earth’s crust are essential for life.
Let us pause for a very brief moment and consider the implications of this
dichotomy that Jonas speaks about. We, unconsciously, look at the majority of the
materials in our world not only as non-living matter, but these elements or chemicals or
compounds have never and will never in and of themselves live. It is interesting that if
you take the chemical reactions that occur in our universe each and every minute of each
and every day, and instead let those same chemical reactions operate in a living being,
that being lives. It is a wonder that the very same reactions that in non-living matter do
not result in consciousness in living things contribute to the life of a living thing. Life and
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non-life is an important dichotomy. These dichotomies seem to permeate every aspect of
our lives, and it is these dichotomies that the phenomenologists seek to challenge or
rethink.
Obviously, another deep dichotomy is the subject-object dichotomy that separates
the viewer from the object viewed. I can argue that, in subtle ways, this subject-object
split changes how we interpret what we see, and furthermore has an effect on our
phenomenological perceptual experience of the process of seeing. These dichotomies lie
at the root of ontology and epistemology in many cases. Foremost among them, and often
the target of phenomenological investigation, stands the Cartesian dualism between mind
and body. I will speak more of Cartesian dualism later.
Hans Jonas clearly articulates the ancient view of seeing, and the supremacy of
vision, in Chapter 6 of The Phenomenon of Life, or alternatively in a separately published
article by the same title as Chapter 6 called, “The Nobility of Sight.” Vision, as outlined
by Jonas, is superior to the other senses in a multitude of ways. First, vision is superior
with regard to the amount of information conveyed by what is seen in an
instant.28 Metaphorically, vision is endowed with the widest bandwidth among all five
senses. In an instant, a vast quantity of information is conveyed to the seer, whereas the
sense of hearing must reveal itself to the listener overtime. This gives vision a timeless,
almost magical quality. Vision is superior because of the great distance that it can
encompass. It is true that we can hear sounds a good distance away, but our ability to
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identify them fades with distance, and the distance allows one to understand the objects
being looked at is in many times greater than that of auditory sensation.29 Vision is
active, while hearing is passive. Hearing occurs whether we wanted to or not. The listener
plays a passive role, in that he or she will hear everything that is making sounds in the
immediate facility.30 We do not choose what we hear, or focus on what we hear, nor can
we stop hearing with the same level of ease in which a person can stop looking.31 It is
true that I can plug my ears manually, but that is hardly the same thing as if I were
looking at something, and blinked my eyes so as not to see it, and opened them again.
One chooses what one wants to look at; vision allows one to have freedom of movement
that most of the other senses do not allow, except for touch.
Although touch allows freedom of choice or movement in what you are touching,
the range is very limited, and, again, unlike vision, touch takes place over time.32 It takes
time to run one’s hands over something and build a picture as to what it is. Vision would
reveal that in an instant to the viewer. Touch also requires time for the three-dimensional
image to formulate fully in the awareness of the one doing the touching.33 I personally
find that I do not like touching large statues or sculptures for that very reason. I cannot
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build in my head a picture of what it is I am looking at that is sufficient to gain an
aesthetic appreciation for that object. Jonas elaborates on this in the following passage:
Indeed only the simultaneity of sight, with its extended ‘present’ of enduring
objects, allows the distinction between change and the unchanging and therefore
between becoming and being. All the other senses operate by registering change
and cannot make that distinction. Only sight therefore provides the sensual basis
on which the mind may conceive the idea of the eternal, that which never changes
and is always present. The very contrast between eternity and temporality rests
upon an idealization of ‘present’ experienced visually as the holder of stable
contents as against the fleeting succession of non-visual sensation.34
The other senses all require interaction with the object, or a reaction to what may be
happening. However, objects that are seen reflect light back upon the viewer according to
their properties. Hearing, on the other hand, requires something to be happening that is
causing the sound, since objects do not make sounds by themselves or return sounds back
to the listener unless something is occurring. Knowing that something is occurring
requires me to react accordingly.
In the case of looking, the object remains untouched, and the observer and the
object observed remain separated and unaffected by the observer seeing the object. This
allows a freedom of choice that one does not have with the other senses. Yet, I will show
that this will later prove to be at odds with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s view as to what a
bodily action really is, or, for that matter, what interacting with objects in the world
requires. What is more, Jonas continues that we can envision objects that we have seen in
the world in the imagination, and have those visual images in the imagination reflect
accurately the object in the real world. Although this can to an extent be done with music,
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it is vision that allows for this tremendous breadth and depth of imaginary action. Jonas
cited the idea that geometry, something that we envision in the mind, reflects universal
principles that hold true in the physical world.35
Now that we have established the value and importance of vision, we can begin to
build an explanation of how that value and importance translates into both a physical and
a conceptual superiority of vision, not just in terms of physical experience, but also in
terms of cultural and philosophical significance. Simply put, as defined by the dictionary,
“ocularcentrism” is the privileging of vision over the other senses. It turns out that even
though this is an exceptionally simple definition of the term, the concept,
“ocularcentrism,” as it plays out across history and across phenomenological and
epistemological discourse, has a far more complex meaning. The term demands deeper
thinking.
To begin with the basics, ocularcentric metaphors literally pepper our language
according to Martin Jay, and we cannot help but use them.36 I happen to use them in fact.
It seems perfectly natural to use such figures of speech as, “I hope you see what I mean.”
If this is so with the case of ordinary language, imagine how our more technical
languages are affected by the ubiquity of such visual metaphors. Although the
concentration of my analysis is speaking of perceptual phenomenological descriptions,
metaphors do have a part to play, as they are ubiquitous and heavily used.
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My focus, though, is not on metaphor, but rather on actual phenomenological
perceptual analysis. I will later speak of and adequately differentiate metaphors from real,
albeit ocularcentric, descriptions of phenomenological experience. Linguistically, it does
appear that vision is very closely associated with language, since often times our ability
to visualize something determines our ability to verbalize it.37 Although the eye has many
noble qualities, it does have certain weaknesses, namely the blind spot in the eyes where
the retina connects to the optic nerve. According to Martin Jay, this fact is often exploited
by the anti-ocularcentric critics who seek to attack ocularcentrism.38 Ocularcentric
concepts or relationships permeate our religions and religious worldviews.39 The divine is
often compared to light from the sun or warmth, while the divine presence watches over
us. In some cases, the sun is worshiped outright, or fire is valued as a religious symbol for
its light and warmth. Mystics seek illumination, and the experience of light has a part to
play metaphysically in many religious systems.40 It would be a simple thing, almost too
irresistibly simple, to open up the Gospel and read the beginning of the Book of John,
noting as you do so how it compares light to word and speaks of the light not being
conquered by the darkness (Cf., Book of John, 1:4-5 and 1:9-13, etc). Also, note the place
of mirrors and reflected light in religion. For instance, the apostle Paul spoke of seeing
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through a glass darkly.41 Although there is a tendency in Judaism and Christianity
towards what Martin Jay calls anti-ocularcentric discourse, it does not reach the intensity
or depth that it seems to reach when Jay describes the way French Phenomenologists
express it.42
Let us keep in mind that there is a difference between metaphors and phenomena.
Metaphors may reveal much about a thinker if he or she uses ocularcentric metaphors,
and they do have an effect on the philosophy or the perceptions of the philosopher.
Metaphors are, in this case, not the most important element in phenomenology, and they
are not my primary focus. They are important, but phenomenologists are using them to
describe how we actually see or experience our world. In order to more clearly
differentiate a visual metaphor from a visual perceptual experience, I want to briefly
discuss metaphors.
At first glance, it seems like we should all know what metaphors are and why we
use them; they are everywhere in our language, our stories, our poetry, our every-day
conversations. We all use them instinctively. They help get our point across more
strongly. The word ‘metaphor’ is from the Greek word ‘metaphora,’ which means ‘a
transfer or a carrying over,’ and ‘phor’ is from the Greek verb ‘pherein,’ which means ‘to
carry’ or ‘to bear.’ A metaphor is a figurative use of language, as revealed in the
following passage: “Metaphor is a poetically or rhetorically ambitious use of words, a

41

Ibid., 13. Of note here are the many Biblical passages Jay draws our attention to.

42

Ibid., 14-15.

30

figurative as opposed to literal use. It has attracted more philosophical interest and
provoked more philosophical controversy than any of the other traditionally recognized
figures of speech.”43 It is very hard to pin down and analyze metaphors. Perhaps some
find such complexity or slipperiness of the meaning of the term frustrating? Max Black
comments on this when he writes:
In general, when we speak of a relatively simple metaphor, we are referring to a
sentence or another expression, in which some words are used metaphorically,
while the remainders are used non-metaphorically. An attempt to construct an
entire sentence of words that are used metaphorically results in a proverb, an
allegory, or a riddle. No preliminary analysis of metaphor will satisfactorily cover
even such trite examples as: ‘In the night all cows are black.’ And cases of
symbolism (in the sense in which Kafka’s castle is a ‘symbol’) also need separate
treatment.44
Insofar as philosophy goes, metaphor was at one time seen as a kind of crime, a falsehood
one should not use, and that in no way clarifies what the philosopher is saying.45 John
Searle points out that some metaphors are easy to spot, but others are not, and if the
metaphor is too obscure one may not be able to understand in any way what the person
means by it. If you hear somebody say, “Sally is a block of ice,” or “Sam is a pig,” you
are likely to assume that the speaker does not mean what he says literally, but that he is
speaking metaphorically. Furthermore, you are not likely to have very much trouble
figuring out what he means. If he says, “Sally is a prime number between 17 and 23,” or
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“Bill is a barn door,” you might still assume he is speaking metaphorically, but it is much
harder to figure out what he means.46
Our language, including the language of philosophy, abounds with metaphors,
very many of them visual. Martin Jay adds to this understanding of metaphor when he
writes:
If this is so with ordinary language, it is no less the case with the specialized
languages intellectuals have designed to lift us out of the commonsensical
understanding of the world around us. As Ian Hacking and Richard Rorty have
recently emphasized, even Western philosophy at its most putatively disinterested
and neutral can be shown to be deeply dependent on occluded visual metaphors.47
Though metaphors seem to bring with them a number of complexities and risks, their
place in philosophical discourse, especially in the Continental tradition, is secure,
according to Clive Cazeaux. He writes about this in the following passage:
The continental tradition from Kant to Derrida, I maintain, provides
arguments, which not only inform and support existing claims for the
cognitive value of metaphor, but also extend the significance of the figure
to the point where it becomes an ontological tension, operating in between
the fundamental distinctions of philosophy.
How is it that metaphor, the description of one thing as something else,
has become so important for questions of knowledge and cognition? There
are, I suggest, a number of reasons. Firstly, the linguistic turn in the
humanities – following the work of Saussure (1883), Frege (1952),
Wittgenstein (1922; 1953), and Whorf (1956) – has foregrounded
awareness of the role our linguistic categories play in the organization of
the world into identifiable chunks. This position can be regarded, to some
extent, as an elaboration of Kant’s thesis that concepts within the mind of
the subject are responsible for determining the nature of reality. A key
question for this view is how objectivity can be confirmed given that the
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task of organizing the world has been assigned to subjective
consciousness. As several commentators have observed, metaphor itself
raises this question.48
Criminal or not, confusing or not, metaphors are deeply embedded in our language and in
our philosophy. They are highly important pieces of our discourse, and there can be no
doubt that they have an important linguistic role to play in the analysis of the
ocularcentric or anti-ocularcentric discourse. Perhaps, a study for another time would
focus specifically on ocularcentric metaphors, or the opposite, in order to determine their
weight and effect on a philosopher’s argument or discourse. Whatever the case may be
for metaphors, they are part of our language and our thought, and subsequently part of
our philosophy.
Concepts in thought and philosophy, or even in our day-to-day experience, may
occupy different roles in context. Some of these roles may be metaphorical, and others
may be of a different sort. The concept of light is a good example of this, as outlined by
Hans Blumenberg in his essay, “Light as Metaphor for Truth” (Chapter 1 of Modernity
and The Hegemony of Vision). In this densely packed essay, Blumenberg outlines the
context and interpretation of light across history from as far back as ancient Greece to the
present day.49 His survey depicts light as it involves, changes, and symbolizes different
abstract concepts in the hands of different philosophical or religious groups.50 Following
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on these insights, I trace the evolution of the context and metaphorical status of light,
since in more ways than not, the way light is portrayed and depicted is directly connected
to the way vision is portrayed and depicted. It is because of light that people can see in
the first place.
The story of light as metaphor for truth begins where so many other philosophical
concepts begin: in Plato's Cave.51 The first metaphor of light for truth we come across is
that of the sun for the philosopher who has escaped from Plato’s Cave with its artificial
lighting and shadows thrown upon the wall. It is a well-known allegory. When the
philosopher leaves the cave and is initially in the light of day, he is blinded by the light. I
find it interesting that when one first enters the darkness one is blinded, and when one
first enters the light one is blinded. Blindest blind. The idea that there is such a thing as
too much light is considered in this metaphorical construct, but in truth there is no such
thing as too much knowledge, which is what light and truth will come to represent in the
enlightenment.52 Blumenberg draws a complex chronology, not all of which requires
repeating, as far as my purposes are concerned. From the ancient Greek concept of
Plato’s Cave, light transitions from a metaphorical concept to a metaphysical one.
Whether it is in Augustinian Christianity, in the Gnostic religions, or for the individual
seeker, light is no longer just a metaphor for truth. It is the presence of the divine and it is
an internal light, light that cannot be seen with the eyes, but instead seen with the mind or
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spirit.53 In order for the concept of light to evolve as it does, the concept of darkness must
also equally evolve.
Darkness is more than the absence of light, or the state in which one does not see.
It is, although oftentimes evil, equally a romantic darkness, darkness that would be a
comfort or an inspiration, since it contains the mystery of love and lovers.54 I suspect,
although I will not investigate further, that Levinas had this sort of darkness in mind
when he talked about fecundity at the end of, Totality and Infinity. Of course, for
Levinas, the night was also a state of terror or insomnia. The cave also evolved. For
Descartes, who hated darkness, which to him represented lack of intelligence or insight,
the cave became the refuge for the scholastics defending their outdated and superseded
knowledge.55 He describes this when he writes:
Their fashion of philosophizing, however, is well suited to persons whose
abilities fall below mediocrity; for the obscurity of the distinctions and
principles of which they make use enables them to speak of all things with
as much confidence as if they really knew them, and to defend all that they
say on any subject against the most subtle and skillful, without its being
possible for anyone to convict them of error. In this they seem to me to be
like a blind man, who, in order to fight on equal terms with a person that
sees, should have made him descend to the bottom of an intensely dark
cave: and I may say that such persons have an interest in my refraining
from publishing the principles of the philosophy of which I make use; for,
since these are of a kind the simplest and most evident, I should, by
publishing them, do much the same as if I were to throw open the
windows, and allow the light of day to enter the cave into which the
combatants had descended. But even superior men have no reason for any
great anxiety to know these principles, for if what they desire is to be able
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to speak of all things, and to acquire a reputation for learning, they will
gain their end more easily by remaining satisfied with the appearance of
truth, which can be found without much difficulty in all sorts of matters,
than by seeking the truth itself which unfolds itself but slowly and that
only in some departments, while it obliges us, when we have to speak of
others, freely to confess our ignorance.56
In fairness to Descartes, these modern-day Aristotelians were holding back knowledge
and hindering the advancement of knowledge by suppressing his work, “The Optics,” and
one might reasonably call them blind to the value of his contributions. In order to
understand Descartes’ theory of seeing, and the metaphor that he used to illustrate it, we
first need to discuss Descartes’ take on dualism.
Now, we call it, Cartesian Dualism.57 Like other dualists, Descartes believed that
the mind and the body were separate, but they could interact. The body could have an
effect on the mind, as in seeing, or the mind could have an effect on the body, as in
emotions, or will, or desire. The mind cannot be divided; it cannot be cut into pieces, as
can the body. The body can be dismembered, but that has no effect on the mind. The
mind and body are connected through the pineal gland, which Descartes thought was
evidence for the soul. He came to realize that anything he experienced in the world
through his senses could be reasonably doubted. The one thing that he came to
understand that could not be doubted or corrupted is the fact that he himself consisted in
his essence of being a thinking thing.58 This creates a separation between the mind and
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the body. They are not made of the same substances. The subject the mind perceives
through the medium of the body is the object out in the world. If you look at an object in
the world, you are seeing as if outside yourself there is the object, as though there were a
little person driving around the body that carries it. There is a subject-object dichotomy, a
subject that will come up over and over again. This is important to understand when the
phenomenologists argue against Descartes’ dualistic theory.
For Descartes, seeing takes place in the mind, not anywhere else, as described by
Martin Jay when he writes:
For many commentators, Descartes is considered the founding father of the
modern visualist paradigm. Thus, for example, Rorty claims that: ‘in the Cartesian
model, the intellect inspects entities modeled on retinal images. In Descartes’s
conception – the one which became the basis for ‘modern’ epistemology – it is
representations which are in the mind.’59
The mind responded to light like touch; in this case, the touch conveyed to a blind man
through the medium of his stick. In the same way that vibrations would travel up the stick
to the hand of the blind man walking with it feeling the ground ahead of him, the eyes
pick up the information that, as it were, travels through the medium of light to the eye
itself.60 Descartes thought light was a kind of still substance that did not travel or move
through any space, as Jay explains in the passage that follows:
Here, as many commentators have remarked, Descartes’s reasoning was neither
deductive nor inductive, but rather analogical, based on a comparative thought
experiment that involved another sense. The analogy between sight and the touch
of a blind man’s stick was an old one, used as early as Simplicius’s commentary
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on Aristotle’s De Anima. The point of the comparison is that both reveal an
instantaneous transmission of the stimulus through pressure, either seen or felt, to
the sensory organ. Descartes’s physics was, in fact, grounded in the assumption
that light passes without any lapse of time through an extended medium that filled
the space between object and eye, no vacuum existing in nature. Nothing material
passes from one to the other – just the pressure conveyed through the medium.
Thus the medieval idea of actual images passing through the air – those
‘intentional’ or ‘visible species’ already called into question by William of
Ockham – was mistaken. Rays of light, for Descartes, were not even movements
per se, but what he calls, somewhat vaguely, ‘an action or inclination to move.’61
According to Descartes, touch was the least fallible of the senses, the one least likely to
be subject to deception on the whim of the Evil Genius.62 The blind man holding the stick
is left in no doubt of how the ground feels ahead of him, its contours, hardness or
softness, etc.63
Descartes was able to imagine and empathize to some extent what it would be like
for a blind person feeling his way across the ground with a cane, and he did so very
effectively. It led him to write:
No doubt you have had the experience of walking at night over rough
ground without a light, and finding it necessary to use a stick in order to
guide yourself. You may then have been able to notice that by means of
the stick you could feel the various objects situated around you, and that
you could even tell whether they were trees or stones or sand or water or
grass or mud or any other such thing. It is true that this kind of sensation is
somewhat confused and obscure in those who do not have long practice
with it. But consider it in those born blind, who have made use of it all
their lives: with them, you will find, it is so perfect and so exact that one
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might almost say that they see with their hands, or that their stick is the
organ of some sixth sense given to them in place of sight.64
The blind man was thought to use two sticks, since, as Martin Jay mentioned above, this
comparison was a medieval one, and Descartes saw it as a geometric triangulation to
explain how the blind man could take in sensory information in space. The two eyes work
the same way as the two sticks.65
In modern day life, blind people use a white cane, one stick. Its purpose is to feel
the ground ahead of where he or she is about to step. The blind person does this by
sweeping the cane in an arc, from left to right, and right to left, approximately shoulderwidth for each arc. The person steps forward with the right foot; they are feeling the
ground ahead of them to their left. Then, they step forward with the left foot, knowing
that it is safe to do so, and swing the cane to the right. This must be timed exactly in order
to give protection to the blind person as he or she walks. It is actually a choreographed
and coordinated motion. It takes a great deal of concentration, but as I will explain in
chapter 3, the use of the cane becomes habituated to such an extent that it becomes
transparent. Why a blind person would use two sticks is difficult for me to imagine. Did
blind people in the Middle Ages perhaps use two sticks for improved balance? It must
have been different in the Middle Ages and Enlightenment. Surely, they must have used
the sticks primarily for support, and felt the ground ahead of them in what would
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probably appear to be, by the standards of our day, a disorganized technique. That is the
only explanation I can come up with as to why any philosophers would draw upon that
metaphor, which is so obviously different now.
The state of blindness and of perception would become increasingly important for
philosophers. There is a very deep ontological need for philosophers to understand reality
both as an objective experience and as a subjective one, assuming that these philosophers
are not phenomenologists. When people ask me, “What can you see?” I sense that deep
down what they are asking me is, “What is the nature of your reality?” In line with these
questions, the opportunity arose for philosophers literally to ask a blind person, “What
can you see?” Even now, over 300 years later, Molyneux’s problem is still a subject for
debate, and still has not entirely been conclusively settled. Indeed, what would happen if
a blind person, having never seen before, had their sight restored? Could they understand
the world, a completely new world that they are now seeing, by translating their tactile
understanding of the world over to the visual?66 This, in essence, is what William
Molyneux, an Irish scientist and politician, wrote to John Locke in 1688, his interest
largely driven by his wife’s loss of sight.67 It took five years for Locke to answer, but
when he did, he included Molyneux’s problem in the 1694 edition of “An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding,” and he presents the problem to us this way:
Suppose a Man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to
distinguish between a Cube and a Sphere of the same metal and of the
66
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same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and the other; which is the
Cube, which the Sphere. Suppose then the Cube and Sphere placed on a
Table, and the Blind Man to be made to see by his sight, before he touched
them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the Globe, which the
Cube.68
Philosophers solved the problem according to somewhat different criteria, guided by
whether they thought perception was experienced then understood, or that there was
some kind of pre-existing foreknowledge of shapes and objects.69
Most of them agreed, however, that it was unlikely the blind man could recognize
the shapes placed before him at first, and that it would take some time before he could
learn how to “see.”70 They had their chance to test their results, when, in 1728, a man
blind since birth had cataracts removed, and his vision was restored to him.71 The French
thinkers thought that there had to be something wrong with the experiment, the questions
asked, or that the man’s eyes needed time to heal, because unfortunately for some of the
researchers, the blind man was unable to recognize the difference between the cube and
the sphere.72
In chapter 3, I will be discussing the connection of the different senses and how
they augment and strengthen one another when I discuss Merleau-Ponty’s
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phenomenology in greater depth than I do in this chapter. It may be here worth noting
that Merleau-Ponty’s response to this problem would have been in line with those who
believed that a person blind since birth could not recognize the two shapes.73 MerleauPonty talks about the experiences of blind people who have their vision restored, how
they react to spatial dimensions, how they interact with the world around them,
discovering to their amazement that in spite of having knowledge, both reasonable and
linguistic, their perceptions are nothing like the truth.74 Tactile information cannot be
transferred literally to visual perception, although the two certainly augment each other
for people whose senses are intact. I will discuss this interconnectivity of the senses in
chapter 3. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology would likely put a new spin on the question,
especially as he engages the problem of perception from a different standpoint, and is
endeavoring in his explorations with a different purpose.
Diderot was eventually inspired to write Letter of the Blind for the Use of Those
Who See, basing his portrayal on the real-life mathematician Nicholas
Saunderson.75 Diderot wanted to take a swipe at Descartes’ rational, albeit theological,
belief in the soul, although he did not go far toward achieving that.76 As far as the history
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of the blind goes, the essay did represent a “turning point” for how the blind were
perceived, painting them in a more positive and humane light.77 According to the authors
of “Blindness and The Age of Enlightenment,” to undermine Descartes’ notion of innate
ideas, including the idea of God, morality, and logic, Diderot chose to write a parable
about men born blind because he saw the so-called primacy of vision as a vulnerable link
in Cartesian reasoning. Diderot wanted to play on the popular misconception that seeing
was synonymous with understanding, thereby minimizing the notion that vision had a
privileged role in human thought and reasoning. Although this strategy seems
convoluted, Diderot was able to weave his treatise into a story of human accomplishment,
which may explain why the work had wide appeal.78 Jay, on the other hand, does not
specifically say as much, but it may be that this essay was the first purposeful, though
unsuccessful, attack on French ocularcentrism launched by French philosophers.
Anti-ocularcentrism is a huge catchall term, and Martin Jay is aware of this.79
Many things can be classified or are classifiable as anti-ocularcentric, including ideas,
metaphors, or images that contradict each other.80 He goes on to explain that antiocularcentric discourse is not organized, and is not a kind of conspiracy where all players
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agree on waging an anti-ocularcentric war.81 Martin Jay draws a vast and compelling
picture of the history and development of this movement. He demonstrates the power and
entrenchment of anti-ocularcentric discourse along with its twin, ocularcentrism. Indeed,
Rukavina suggests that anti-ocularcentrism is merely another way of seeing, and thus is
ocularcentric after all.82 If anti-ocularcentrism is another way of seeing, then it is not
enough to focus on the opposite (or on the simple absence) of seeing and call it antiocularcentric. In order for a philosopher to present an argument that is anti-ocularcentric,
the argument cannot focus on the eye, or depend on vision—or on a mere lack of vision.
While as a social critic Jay examines how anti-ocularcentric discourse moves away from
ocularcentrism, as a blind phenomenologist I will be setting out to find a viable
alternative to the entire category of “ocularcentrism” and “anti-ocularcentrism.” As we
will see, Levinasian ethics will ultimately provide me with that viable alternative.
Ocularcentrism does seem to include its opposite, and that is the reason why Jay
can trace so many different occurrences of ocularcentrism manifesting across history. The
main thrust of his book, however, is the vast movement in the 20th century against
ocularcentrism that French thinkers initiated. Although there may be a few reasonable
contenders as to whom the credit can be given for beginning the anti-ocularcentric attack
in earnest, Martin Jay follows Hannah Arendt by arguing that it was Henri Bergson who
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began the wave of anti-ocularcentric discourse in the 20th century.83 It was Bergson who,
among other things, established the body as the central point and opening to the world,
and to experiences in the world.84 The true frontal attack as Martin Jay calls it
commenced at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century.85 I have said and
will argue in detail that Merleau-Ponty takes the first step towards a philosophically antiocularcentric discourse not just as a knee-jerk reaction to ocularcentrism, but as an actual
step that overcomes the paradigm of ocularcentric discourse. It is true that MerleauPonty’s goal may have been somewhat different, since Martin Jay argues that MerleauPonty is trying to revitalize the value of vision.86 However, like so many thinkers that
Martin Jay examines, Merleau-Ponty can serve equally in certain respects as
ocularcentric or anti-ocularcentric, and it is very difficult to determine exactly how one
should categorize his thought. It is this question that will occupy a fair amount of the
material in Chapter 3 in this study.
Jay has described and categorized the achievements of the anti-ocularcentric
movement when he writes in the following passage:
… three changes must be singled out for special mention. The first concerns what
can be termed the detranscendentalization of perspective; the second, the
recorporealization of the cognitive subject; and the third, the revalorization of
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time over space. In all of these ways, the status of visual primacy was brought
into question.87
Merleau-Ponty’s thought primarily takes up the second of Jay’s changes that he outlined.
But, inadvertently, Merleau-Ponty’s work will also embrace the first change. I will
discuss this in more detail in Chapter 3. Meanwhile, Martin Jay also draws a wider
picture that, while the attack on ocularcentrism was beginning, a real war broke out
(WWI). What people witnessed in the war through pictures of it (created both as
photography and in the minds of people) had the effect of destabilizing and perhaps of
“disenchanting” the hegemony of the eye.88 Martin Jay cites several examples of the war
and of reactions to it.
The Surrealists, a very wide and diverse group of artists, were affected by views
from the trenches and views from the air.89 Human beings were literally seeing things
that had not been possible or thinkable before the war. Although initially enchanted by
the dreamlike quality of cinema, Surrealists themselves were quickly disillusioned of
their former love for it.90 Most likely this occurred, according to Martin Jay, when they
recognized how difficult making films actually was.91 It is not my intention to summarize
every artist, thinker, or participant in the anti-ocularcentric movement, but rather simply
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to demonstrate how Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas were both surrounded by
multiple participants in a large social and intellectual upheaval. Their works and
conclusions are responses to the movement, and to some degree active elements of it.
For Martin Jay, many different thinkers fall under the rubric of antiocularcentrism. In general terms, anyone who critiques in any way, denigrates, rejects,
pushes back against, questions, subverts, or in any way blinds the eye, is included. Jay
describes the anti-ocularcentric works of the surrealist Georges Bataille and his surrealist
pornographic novella The Story of The Eye, in which, through violent imagery and
metaphor, Bataille very definitely does denigrate the eye.92 Martin Jay also mentions
Sartre’s complicated and ambivalent relationship with vision.93 Sartre is both fearful of
being blinded, and is also fearful of being the object of the gaze of another for fear of
having his shame seen by the other. Yet, in his writings according to Jay, he seeks to be
as transparent as possible, revealing as much about his personal life and internal
emotional or intellectual flaws as he is able to for the sake of honesty.94
A philosopher may be both interpretable as ocularcentric and as anti-ocularcentric
at the same time for the same reason. This is the case with Husserl, who was a
tremendous influence on Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, and is viewed as too ocularcentric,
and critiqued for it by Levinas. Yet Husserl also provides the tools that Merleau-Ponty

92

Ibid., 216.

93

Ibid., 276.

94

Ibid., 276-280.

47

uses to present an anti-ocularcentric discourse.95 Husserl was criticized both by Levinas
and by one of Merleau-Ponty’s followers for being too visual and ocularcentric because
of his concept of the timeless blink.96 But, paradoxically, he also cleared the way for the
intertwining of subject and object – which I will be speaking of presently in chapter
three. By focusing more on the lifeworld [Lebenswelt] instead of the transcendental ego
and its essence, Husserl opened the door for Merleau-Ponty’s argument, which grounded
phenomenology completely in the body, while at the same time removing the subjectobject split.97 This gave Merleau-Ponty a potent weapon to use against Cartesian
dualism.98
Although all these things can be accurately and truthfully classified as antiocularcentric, the anti-ocularcentrism that I am seeking in this study is the kind of
philosophical, metaphysical anti-ocularcentrism that allows one to break free of its bonds.
This may mean ocularcentrism is refuted; it may also mean simply that the conditions of
the argument are changed, such that ocularcentrism no longer serves a relevant purpose.
For example, Merleau-Ponty’s intertwining of the subject and the object represents a first
step for me, along with his embodiment phenomenology. These things do not suggest
anti-ocularcentrism merely because they go against ocularcentrism.
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CHAPTER 3: MERLEAU-PONTY TAKES THE FIRST STEP AWAY FROM
OCULARCENTRISM?
“I would like to see more clearly, but it seems to me that no one sees more clearly.”
Maurice Merleau-Ponty99
I.
In this chapter, I explore how Merleau-Ponty’s embodiment seems to move
beyond ocularcentrism by including the whole body in his phenomenology. I will give
examples that demonstrate how he includes disabled people and their perceptions as part
of his phenomenology. Then, I will give examples that qualify his inclusion of disabled
or blind phenomenological experiences. If it is the case that Merleau-Ponty in any way
and anywhere rejects blind phenomenological experiences, then he is still ocularcentric,
and does not represent a step forward. Finally, I will contrast Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology with that of Emmanuel Levinas, who very definitely and decisively
breaks out of ocularcentrism with his metaphysical system.
In this context, we might also consider a critique of ocularcentrism based on the
work of Martin Jay. In Downcast Eyes, he argues that Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s
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phenomenology represents a “new ontology of seeing.”100 I argue that Merleau-Ponty did
indeed take the first step away from an ontology limited by ocularcentric perspectives,
but there is no break from ontology (as we will later find in Levinas) as the foundation of
his phenomenological explorations. Jay maintains that Merleau-Ponty sought to create a
new ontology that would bring about a new system, freed from the previous ocularcentric
paradigm. It is based on Jay’s cultural critique of ocularcentrism that I attempt to find a
metaphysical path out of ocularcentrism, which is a different goal from Jay’s, and with a
potentially different conclusion. Jay seems to imply that Merleau-Ponty’s new ontology
is somehow less ocularcentric than previous philosophers. Jay’s ocularcentrism is based
on his cultural critique of it through the Frankfurt School,101 and differs from my
understanding of ocularcentrism, as I have previously argued. For Jay, speaking
generally, his ocularcentric discourse is any discourse that denigrates or removes the eye
from its central position, as described by Jonas, and relegates it to a place of inferiority.
In short, if in any way the eye and its vision is held suspect or violently reacted against,
that is anti-ocularcentrism.
Merleau-Ponty includes all five of our senses that we experience, without
favoring one over another.102 The sensory experiences are ordinary experiences that we
all share; yet, Merleau-Ponty also includes emotional content, imagination, language,
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culture, and history as part of his phenomenological picture.103 Vision is still a highly
important piece of his phenomenological analysis, as exemplified by the essay, “Eye and
Mind.” Since Merleau-Ponty includes the entire body, all five senses, and even our
emotions in his study of perception, I maintain that upon these grounds he is not strictly
ocularcentric, since he does not elevate vision at the expense of the other senses. Yet he
does not appear to break away from ocularcentrism.
II.
Komarine Romdenh-Romluc stated that Merleau-Ponty saw himself as continuing
Husserl’s work in the most accurate way possible.104 We will often interpret our
conscious experiences in the light of what we believe we know; that is, our scientific
knowledge or our natural experiences of the world around us.105 For Merleau-Ponty, a
proper way to use phenomenology to more truthfully understand perception is to
understand that the perceiving mind is the incarnated mind.106 Our perceptions are not the
result of forces or circumstances acting upon us, causing the perceptions to occur.
Instead, our perceptions are not brought about or caused by an outside world acting upon
a mind inside a body, or by the body and brain’s physiological response to
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stimuli.107 Merleau-Ponty argued against the objectification and separation of the human
body.108 He wanted to research the way an individual’s consciousness interacts
differently with the body or with inanimate objects, not classifying the body as another
object, acted upon and controlled by forces in the world, or accepting that perception may
be accounted for as a response to environmental factors.109 Science, as far as he was
concerned, did not properly recognize that its observations are built upon lived
experiences of human beings in the world. Merleau-Ponty resisted the diminution of the
subject that science often projects upon a person.110 A person is not the outcome of
materialistic processes, but is the source of its own existence.111 Hence, as I will show
below, he formulated his objections against what he calls empiricism, behaviorism, or
scientific realism. Equally, his objection against the idealists is grounded in the fact that
they separated the mind from the body, making consciousness stand apart from the
body.112
Merleau-Ponty takes the perceptual experiences we have of objects in the world
as entire experiences. He does not break them down into sensory units, or individual
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sensations, as did many philosophers up until the early 20th century.113 We do not have
singular sensory experiences of blue or red for instance. We experience blue or red as one
quality of the object that we perceive in its entirety as part of the greater whole. This
experience is against the backdrop of our other sensory experiences.114 Even from our
preliminary discussions, we can see that there is no such thing as a homogeneous color
sensation.115 According to Romdenh-Romluc, if you lie on your back staring up at the
sky, the blue sky filling your field of vision, so that all you see is blue, is not a
homogeneous sensation, since one would also feel his or her position in space, the ground
against the back, the warmth of the sun, etc. This is not an example of a pure sensation.116
All of these so-called sensations are experienced spatially. We feel an itch in a certain
place in or on our bodies. Our fingers hurt. We experience perceptions within the totality
of the entire body, along with our other senses.117 They occupy a point in space. The
wooly red of the carpet is significant apart from its being red, but rather, it is significant
as part of the carpet, not as redness, but as that particular red in the context of that
particular object.118 There is more to our experience of seeing a house than that part of
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the house we see. We automatically see it as complete and having a back even if we
never see the back.119 Merleau-Ponty draws upon Husserl’s ideas of the lived experience
both in the world120 and on Sartre’s idea of the lived body121 in order to deobjectify and
unify the body with consciousness against the view that they are separate.122
For Merleau-Ponty, who wishes to refute the transcendental Neo-Kantian
philosophy of his day, the experiences that we have are not being created in the mind and
are composed of mental representations. We instead experience them directly as they are.
The experiences that we have are real in themselves.123 We experience the world, in this
body, arranged around the body as the central axis of our experiences. We experience
objects around us and our perceptions as having spatial orientation with regard to us, as in
left, right, ahead, behind, above, below, etc.124 The body has an automatic faculty that
arranges the world that we experience for us. People see colors as constant, even when
the light changes.125
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The world is given to us as a series of possibilities or actions that I can take. There
is not a mind separated from the body that delivers and decides, as in “I think,” as
envisioned by Descartes or by the Intellectualists. It is an “I can,” which encompasses all
the possibilities and choices we could potentially make without needing to think and
decide beforehand.126 When Merleau-Ponty studies phantom limbs as experienced by
patients who have lost a limb, he finds that they experience conflict between the “habitual
body,” and the body that is actually there. That is, if one is missing a hand, but still feels
the hand as if it were there, one still possesses the “I can” of the habitual body, and may
attempt to use that hand as such, before truly learning that the hand is missing, and
recognizing that the “I can” of today does not match the “I can” of
yesterday.127 Moreover, even our language, something we might consider certain proof
that there is a thinking mind separated from our body, is not something that I think before
I speak. Rather, language is as much an embodied expression of the “I can” as is walking
or playing the piano, or some other physical activity.128 One Intellectualist attempt at
explaining how our behavior is initiated is that our behavior is directly controlled by our
thoughts. We think of doing an action, and we do it. We have symbolic representations,
in our minds, of the action that we are going to carry out. And we act accordingly.
Obviously, Merleau-Ponty objects to the idea that we have a mind separate from our
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body that acts first through abstract thought, a decision, and then, the person carries out
the decided upon course of action. For the Intellectualists, consciousness exists separately
from the body.
On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty sees our capacity to conduct automatic
movements, coping with the situation at hand, as habit, as absorbed coping, or as
“reckoning with the possible.”129 I should rather call that “skill,” as Hubert Dreyfus
translates it in various papers and lectures. It feels as though calling it a skill is more a
reflection of what it truly is, as opposed to habit. I expect Merleau-Ponty calls it so
because it is an automatic gesture, and some habits are automatic, and done without
thinking. I chew my nails without thinking. The difference is habits are uncontrolled
unconscious actions, most of which are hurtful in the short or long term to the individual,
or are something he or she wishes to stop. It is true, that certain movements or
negotiations of the world appear automatic and reflexive. But, that does not constitute it
as being a habit. Skill is what allows the woman to not brush the feather of her cap
against the doorway, accounting for the extra space her cap will take up while negotiating
that doorway.130 Our ability to learn different skills, driving for instance, or walking
through a narrow doorway wearing a hat with a feather without brushing that feather
against the side of the doorway, demonstrates how a skill that we acquire using an
external object integrates that object into the body image, or body schema, of the person.
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For Merleau-Ponty, following the Gestalt psychologists, the environment has to
offer opportunities for an action, or one sees an invitation by an object to do a given
action. One must also have the skills to carry out the action.131 The objects in a person’s
environment are more than just objects. They have significance to the perceiver. They
also have context. So, along with an object seemingly inviting a person towards a given
action, the context also determines whether or not it is wholly appropriate or reasonable
that the person should take that particular given action.132 A soccer ball naturally looks
kickable. It invites a person to kick it because that is its purpose. On the soccer field, one
can use skills to play soccer to kick that ball and not be out of place doing it. When there
is not a game in progress, however, it is not in the proper context of the rules of the game.
If you are playing the game and somebody kicks the ball at you, you would be expected
to kick it to another player, or to kick it into the goal. If someone were to kick it at you
during a time when there was not a game in progress, you would probably avoid it as a
threat, or one would avoid it because kicking the ball would be out of place anywhere but
in a soccer game.133 A glass of water may invite us to drink. It is natural to drink it. We
are given the opportunity to carry out a given skill by the environment. If we have the
corresponding motor skills to match, then we can carry out the activity.134 Consciousness
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is embodied; the body itself constitutes consciously the world it perceives, according to
its maximum grip on the objects in that world, objects that have invited the grip to be
gotten, according to their purpose, or according to previous interactions. Kittens invite to
be stroked, cups invite to be drunk from, chairs to be sat on, fruits to be eaten, etc.; which
is at once a feeling of being invited to stroke, drink, sit, and eat.135
Merleau-Ponty accepts that certain thoughts have representational content, but he
denies that they are “inner” items. He argues instead that to think a thought is to express
it. Expressions can have representational content, but they are not the sorts of thing that
can populate a private, inner realm. Moreover, only embodied beings are capable of
expression. It follows that to be a thinker one must be embodied. The mind cannot be
simply identified with the brain.136 What constitutes the make-up of a person is their
embodied thoughts and expressions, which are an interconnected whole, and the context
and meaning those expressions may have. If we are thinking, our thoughts often manifest
as art, poetry, painting, etc. Merleau-Ponty denies the separation between the mind and
the body as Descartes said, and suggests that even our words, or our artistic creations, and
the thoughts that appear to be their origin, are embodied.137 We do not speak as a direct
result of the thoughts we have. When it seems as though we have private inner thoughts,
and seem to hear an inner dialogue taking place, this is not because thoughts are separate
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from speech, but because speech is a physical action. We are in fact sub-vocalizing and
rehearsing the bodily expression of that action.138
Also, when we imagine a close friend, we are reckoning with the possible because
our interactions with this friend are embodied actions. We are led to behave in a certain
manner while interacting with this person, and we perceive their familiarity and affection.
By thinking of this person, we are reenacting that embodied perception, in a pseudo or
holographic manner. One cannot introspect about them, or claim that they are separate
from the body, as Descartes did. What is more, our thoughts are often incomplete. It takes
speaking or writing to make the thought manifest in the world. Even very complex or
higher order skill is classifiable as embodied. If Descartes is right, then learning a skill
requires that we follow a rule. Following a rule requires that we think about that action in
order to follow it. We may begin to see the problems with such a view when we realize
that, in order to think about that rule, we have to recognize that we are thinking, et cetera,
et cetera. We have to learn that rule from somebody else, which implies thinking
privately while considering it.
Humans are designed to copy other humans’ behaviors. Hubert Dreyfus very
articulately diagrams this process, suggesting overall that it is the novice who follows
rules to the letter, and the skillful expert who recognizes when opportunities invite certain
higher order skillful actions to be carried out.139 Dreyfus demonstrates this situation by
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describing the various stages a chess player goes through while learning the game. As the
chess player increases in experience, she will recognize winning situations and
opportunities as invitations for strategic action, the same way we recognize opportunities
in our other embodied actions. Thoughts and their expressions are two smaller pieces of
an interconnected whole, and there are no independent abstract objects that exist separate
and apart from the expression. The meanings of words are significant only to the
consciousness experiencing the words, but they are not arbitrary.140 I do not assign the
meaning to the word that I use, but we have different languages on the planet. So the
meaning of those words or sounds is part of a wider context.141 The subject may have the
language given to him, as from the world, but the body constitutes the meaning of the
words, according to the context of the given situation or motor intentional act. The new
acts are the body’s acquisition of new skills, and new ways either to act directly, or to
“reckon with the possible,” expanding the ways in which the subject can come to a
maximum grip on the world. Thinking is an action, a bodily action, just like walking, iceskating, or driving a car.
Certain qualities of seen objects bleed over into the other senses, especially in
synesthesia. When you see a heavy object, it is as though the weight of the object is felt
in the hands. The senses bleed into each other, complimenting each other, and
constructing a Gestalt experience of the world. The body constitutes the world as a
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unified whole. The body unifies the senses as one continuum; one does not see through
two eyes, but one continuous field.142 The body has a kind of knowledge built into it; it is
not as the rationalists say it is, that one actively thinks the world into synthesis, but that it
already always is.143 One may not always recognize at first what is being perceived or
seen. It may appear to be a random splash of colors randomly strewn about the visual
field. But, as the body adjusts to what it is sensing, it integrates the past into the present,
and one recognizes what it is that is being seen. In this case, Merleau-Ponty is speaking
about looking at his table.
Once the table is recognized for being a table, it turns out that it was always a
table, and has always been recognized as a table. It was as if there was never that period
of confusion before the recognition. There is no way to re-create the fact that there has
ever been a mistake made. The body integrates past, present, and future, according to
Merleau-Ponty.144 Space is more than that place which is occupied by a given object.
Space is also its orientation, in relation to other objects, and space is the body’s
orientation up, down, left, right, forward, and backward. Merleau-Ponty discusses
experiments done to reverse the visual image, so that the top is the bottom. This
scrambles the person’s physical tactile perception and kinesthetic awareness. But, after a
few days, the person adapts to the new incoming information.145 He attempts to show,
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through discussing these experiments, that the senses are integrated as one unified whole.
The body is in a constant engagement with the world to get the best connection, what
Hubert Dreyfus calls “maximum grip,” and, as such, adapts to all incoming or integrated
sensory data. The body, seemingly, has an automatic ability to adjust to any environment.
Merleau-Ponty recounts a number of experiments where participants wore glasses that
turned their perspective upside down, or wherein they saw reflected images at strange
angles. Though the twisted visual information disoriented them at first, the body always
corrected to those stimuli to give the person full control and bodily balance once again.146
The appearance of the objects that we see can also be imbued by extrasensory
content, either drawing from sensory information that is tactile or kinesthetic, or they
may be enhanced with emotional context. For instance, Merleau-Ponty points out that to
a child who has been burned by candle flame, the candle flame now looks menacing and
has that quality added to it when the child sees it.147 When I see you have the woolly
looking rug, mentioned above, the appearance of that rug being woolly is how I would
expect the rug to feel if I touched it. The information being conveyed to the visual sense
is enhanced by an expectation of tactile sensory information. My “inner” emotional
landscape dramatically alters how the world will present itself to me. Merleau-Ponty sees
our moods or our emotional states as embodied actions like all of our other bodily
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actions. These change how we interact with the world, reckon with the possible, or cope
with the world.148
Love is like any other motor skill. It is an action that we perform on the world.
The mood of love is our opening to the world, and is an action that we engage in and
thereby interact with the world.149 This is counterintuitive, because we believe our
emotional states are passive, or that they are responses to the world around us or to our
internal circumstances. But there are no abstract objects, and there is no internal mind or
emotional entity separate from the body, or else Descartes would be correct. The
perceiver plays an active role, not a passive one, in terms of their perception. The world
allows for certain perceptions, and the perceiver acts skillfully in the world, so that the
person’s perception is a combination of what the world allows them the opportunity to
do, and what the perceiver, for lack of a better word, projects into the world. It is an
action created jointly by the world and the perceiver.150
When I love, I experience the landscape as a unified loving whole. Objects invite
me to act. The cat invites me to pet her. The chair in the sunlight invites me to sit outside.
Things I would have found troubling before enhance the glow transmitted to me by the
world. We can also recognize whether other people are in love. We observe their
behavior, and though we do not feel love at that moment, we see the qualities that invite
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the other person’s behavior. And, we can see by that person’s behaviors and actions that
they love. We can also see qualities in objects that we do not feel at the time, but those
qualities invite love from the person we are observing. Then, we see those qualities for
ourselves, and we too may feel as part of that loving invitation.151 Romdenh-Romluc
writes about this in the following passage:
The analysis can also accommodate cases such as the gloomy landscape.
One may at first find this claim puzzling, since it is extremely implausible
to hold that the landscape feels gloomy, interacts with the world gloomily,
or sees the world as gloom inducing. It is also implausible to hold that
anyone who perceives the landscape as gloomy sees it as capable of being
a subject of gloom in these ways. Nevertheless, it seems that the landscape
is perceived as a quasi-subject of gloominess. This claim may initially
seem odd. However, the phenomenon in hand is actually commonplace. It
includes, for example, the anthropomorphizing of inanimate things. A
teddy bear can appear contented. A lone tree growing in the middle of a
building site can look forlorn. A squat coffee mug can appear jolly. In all
of these examples, the inanimate thing is perceived as something capable
of having emotions, that is, as a subject.152
III.
A strong foundation for Merleau-Ponty’s research, an element I will be coming
back to repeatedly since it deals with disability, is his reliance on the Gestalt
psychologists, and their analyses of war veterans with brain damage who were
subsequently disabled.153 He is able to extract much support for his theories by studying
the dysfunction caused by such injuries.154 In the case of either tactile, visual, or brain
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damaging alterations to how sensory experiences are processed, he proposes to better
understand and analyze the qualities and characteristics of perception by examining its
breakdown. A great deal of his study is famously focused on the deficits and disabilities
of a brain-damaged soldier named Schneider.155 His deficits are unusual and various. In
another attempt at understanding the perceptual experiences of disability, he writes
imaginatively, as if from the perspective of the blind man using a white cane.156 Through
all of these, he hopes to uncover the hidden workings of perception and show how the
body constitutes our reality. We cannot consciously remember our perceptions; we
cannot see ourselves seeing. The changes that a person sees or experiences leading to
understanding something are obscured and hidden from us.157 The sensory process
remains mysterious to us in certain aspects that are revealed in cases of dysfunction.
In a seemingly counterintuitive move, Merleau-Ponty takes up a number of
examples of bodily disability in order to highlight, review, and study perception. In one
example, he expressed his hypothesis very directly, maybe accidentally, that through the
study of damaged perceptions or missing perceptual information, he thought he could
arrive at a stronger understanding of how humans perceive when they are healthy. He
describes this in the following passage:
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Take the act of attention whereby I locate a point on my body which is
being touched. The analysis of certain disorders having their origin in the
central nervous system, and which make such an identification impossible,
reveals the profound workings of consciousness. 158
In yet another example, Merleau-Ponty cites the usefulness of studying the damaged
reactions of disabled people according to their perceptual deficits. The organism tries to
adapt to its environment in the most efficient way it can. In order to better highlight this
concept, Merleau-Ponty contrasts the anosognosic with the amputee with phantom limb
syndrome. In the one case, the person is unaware of his or her disability, while in the
other, there is a sensation of the missing limb, that may or may not feel as though it were
still attached and in pain. Merleau-Ponty explored in a phenomenological fashion the
implications of such a disability when he writes the following:
It is true that in the case of the phantom limb the subject appears to be
unaware of the mutilation and relies on his imaginary limb as he would on
a real one, since he tries to walk with his phantom leg and is not
discouraged even by a fall. But he can describe quite well, in spite of this,
the peculiarities of the phantom leg, for example its curious motility, and
if he treats it in practice as a real limb, this is because, like the normal
subject, he has no need, when he wants to set off walking, of a clear and
articulate perception of his body: it is enough for him to have it ‘at his
disposal’ as an undivided power, and to sense the phantom limb as
vaguely involved in it.159
I have shown these examples at this point in the chapter generally as a means of sharing
with the reader the flavor of Merleau-Ponty’s studies, and his tone when speaking of the
disabled. Some of these examples I will go into greater depth on – i.e., the blind man’s
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cane – whereas others need only be briefly mentioned. Merleau-Ponty’s examples are so
copious that I only need highlight a select few. These will be the ones dealing with vision
and with the bodies feeling in space.
It is very interesting and strange that Merleau-Ponty proposes to use disabled
phenomenological experiences as a model through which to enhance the able-bodied
understanding of “normal functioning” individuals with fully functioning
phenomenological fields. To me, as a blind metaphysician, this could cut one of two
ways. It may be that Merleau-Ponty’s thought includes the disabled phenomenal field on
an equal footing with those of the able-bodied. Or, it could be that the disabled
phenomenal field is inferior (inferior by reason of its being broken and incomplete) to
that of the normal person coping with the world. There may be a reduction of the
individual’s ability to reckon with the possible or cope with the world, and as reflective
of that reduction, that person’s perceptual experiences are deemed less. In the next few
paragraphs, I propose to examine this possibility. First, taking up the idea that MerleauPonty sees disabled people as equal in terms of phenomenal experience, and, secondly, in
terms of inferiority. If it proves to be the case that he has any reason to perceive blindness
as a reduction of capacity, then it would be an error to attempt to argue persuasively that
Merleau-Ponty’s thought represents a step away from ocularcentrism. It would truly be,
in that case, as Martin Jay describes it, a new ocularcentric ontology. While on the one
hand, Merleau-Ponty is taking a step forward by including the rest of our bodily senses in
his analysis, viewing the perceptual experiences of disabled people in any way as being
lesser than those of able-bodied people would qualify him as remaining ocularcentric. His
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thought would not be at the same level of ocularcentrism as other French thinkers of his
generation, but it would still be placing the eye and its vision at the pinnacle of perceptual
value. The trouble with Merleau-Ponty is that his thought can be argued convincingly to
lean heavily in either direction, or even in both at once.
Disability occurs when there is damage to the mind or the body. Even phrasing it
in such a way suggests that we are unconsciously Cartesian in outlook. Some disabilities
physically affect the brain and its capacity to think where to proceed, while others affect
our ability to move our physical strength or our coordination. In the view of the natural
opinion on disability, whether or not someone believes in the soul, it is common to
suggest that the able-bodied soul (putting it ironically) is imprisoned by, trapped in,
contained by, limited by, challenged by, tested by a body that – although disabled –
is separated from “the soul” of the individual in question. It is common when speaking
of persons suffering from Parkinson's disease to say that the mind is as sharp as ever, but
is trapped in a body that it cannot control. In my experience as a blind person, I have had
to contend with the common perception that although on the one hand I cannot physically
see, on the other hand I have some sort of compensatory increase in either my other
physical senses, my spiritual awareness or perception, my mental acuity or emotional
intelligence, and other such assumptions. These assumptions may or may not be true.
The idea continues, however, that apart from a handicapped “shell” there is inside
of that “shell” a soul of equal value, or a mind of equal worth. Throughout, disability
exemplifies dichotomy and separation, and such dichotomies Merleau-Ponty wished to
overcome forever. It is as though the disabled person exemplifies the subject/object
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dichotomy – that she is a “soul” (the subject) and her disabled “shell” is the object that
she has to cope with. Implicit in these complicated concepts of what constitutes a human
being, we can face a determination projected upon us by others that we are fully equal to
yet limited, or unequal to according to our limited capacities. You might hear people say
that the soul of the person is equal since we all have them. Or, you might hear it said
somewhat more quietly, that we must be realistic when dealing with coping and adapting
to our disabilities and limitations. Merleau-Ponty seeks to do something entirely different
in his thought with regard to what constitutes a human being, but his interpretation faces
equivalent challenges.
Merleau-Ponty has a different concept of how we perceive and interact with the
world. We do not think before we act or separately from our actions and then act because
of our thoughts. The body is conscious. A person’s motor skills and capacities
determined how they act in the world and determines or limits the range of actions we are
capable of performing. When dealing with the world, our motor skills allow us to reckon
with the possible. Our perceptions are built cooperatively between the environment’s
affects upon us, and our motor skills and capabilities of reckoning with the possible.
Speech is a motor skill. The words we speak at a given time in a given social situation are
not determined by our thoughts, but by our recognition of specific opportunities to use
those skills to reckon with the possible. It is about use and utility.
Our emotions are also motor skills. Our emotions change our perceptions
according to their qualities. Our senses complement each other and work as one
continuous whole to augment and enrich our perceptions. We cope with the world and
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reckon with the possible to our fullest capacity. The question I ask in this and the
following section of this chapter is according to Merleau-Ponty’s schema, do our
disabilities have an effect on us that ultimately causes inequalities with regards to our
perception or our motor skills when acting in the world? Does Merleau-Ponty in the final
analysis see disabled people and their altered perceptions and motor skills as being less
valuable or less complete? Is there an implicit bias in favor of “normal” human beings
and their perceptions? Or, does his unique, imaginative, and creative new ontological
interpretation of what constitutes a human being actually provide dignity and a new
avenue for equality to disabled people?
The argument in favor of Merleau-Ponty’s system granting any quality of
indignity to the phenomenological experiences of disabled people is supported when he
writes the following:
In the self-evidence of this complete world in which manipulatable objects still
figure, in the force of their movement that still flows towards him, and in which is
still present the project of writing or playing the piano, the cripple still finds the
guarantee of his wholeness. But in concealing his deficiency from him, the world
cannot fail simultaneously to reveal it to him: for if it is true that I am conscious
of my body via the world, that it is the unperceived term in the center of the world
towards which all objects turn their face, it is true for the same reason that my
body is the pivot of the world: I know that objects have several facets because I
could make a tour of inspection of them, and in that sense I am conscious of the
world through the medium of my body.160
Initially, his declaration seems positive. He seems to imply that the disabled person’s
inability to walk does not reduce his world or his ability to cope with it beyond the
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exception of the fact that the man cannot walk. He does not appear to imply that his
phenomenological experiences are lessened by his handicap. Nor does he seem to imply
that this individual is rendered less capable. This person’s body is still the center of the
world around which all objects flow. It seems that this person is no less integrated with
the world. One may argue that this quote does not demonstrate a novel interpretation,
because it is while this person is playing the piano that he is unaffected by his inability to
walk. Then again, I cannot play the piano. Is that a handicap or merely a lack of a given
motor skill?
People who have properly functioning vision cannot always see everything in
their world in any case. They can only see what they are looking out for. The fact that
they cannot see everything in their world, however, does not disconnect them from those
objects that they cannot see, whether they know what they are specifically or not. Are we
looking at the sensory deficit as an actual absence, or are we looking at a sensory deficit
as something that may prevent a person from knowing the full details of the world, but
that does not erase parts of that person’s world? Do the objects in my world that I do not
know and have no way of verifying or learning about exist? Do they have an effect on
me? My capacity to reckon with the possible is already limited and shaped by my project.
Romdenh-Romluc often speaks of rock climbing and the person being able to recognize
the ability to do that.161 If I were to walk by those cliffs whether or not I was aware of
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those cliffs looming over me, I am not a rock climber and it would mean nothing to me.
Is that the same thing as being unaware of aspects of the physical world? Not having the
ability to reckon with the possible may be a personally chosen limitation, but it may also
result from disability. How do we determine the difference? Perception is more than
simply registering the existence of a given object with your senses.162 A full perceptual
experience involves reckoning with the possible. That is, a person recognizes that they
have the potential to carry out a given task bodily when they recognize certain
environmental cues. It is more than just simply seeing or hearing the echoes change as a
result of a given object. That would be taking things back to the empiricist view,
measuring the senses as being separated, and entirely made up of individual building
blocks of sensation. We have already ruled this out.
The phenomenal field is something that I possess and that I am connected to, and
the objects in and of themselves exist on my horizon, whether or not I make full use of
them, or whether or not I am even aware of them.163 The being said of the world, as one
great vast exemplification of being, has an effect on me since it exists, whether I am fully
capable or fully aware of interacting with it.164 Merleau-Ponty suggests that even if I am
aware of hearing something, and then through concentration stop hearing sounds, and
then hear them once again, the idea that there is sound in the world is not negated, nor is
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the world or any part of the world negated.165 In other words, these things exist whether I
am aware of their existence in my consciousness or not.166 In my case, I am fully aware
of the existence of a given object, and if I have had previous interaction with it and then
made aware of it. In the sense of my direct experience, if I have not previously been
made aware of a given place or object, that place or object does not exist for me, in that
that place or object will not be a part of my options to reckon with the possible. I cannot
draw upon that place or object, because it has not previously been made known to me. I
may stumble across it, in which case it is immediately part of my list of choices and
options that I have the potential to take. We cannot say that it does not exist because I am
not aware of it. But could we say that it may as well not exist? What is the difference?
As far as a positive view of the disabled phenomenal field goes, what MerleauPonty says in the quote above that I have been drawing from, seems to suggest that in this
case he does view it positively. It turns out that he ended up saying the following:
Just as, in the hearing subject, the absence of sounds does not cut off all
communication with the world of sounds, so in the case of a subject deaf
and blind from birth, the absence of the visual and auditory worlds does not
sever all communication with the world in general. There is always
something confronting him, a being to be deciphered, an omnitudo
realitatis, and the foundation of this possibility is permanently laid by the
first sensory experience, however narrow or imperfect it may be. We have
no other way of knowing what the world is than by actively accepting this
affirmation that is made every instant within us; for any definition of the
world would be merely a summary and schematic outline, conveying
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nothing to us, if we did not already have access to the determinate, if we
did not in fact know it by virtue of the mere fact that we are.167
While I take Merleau-Ponty in this quote to be expressing a positive interpretation of the
phenomenal field of someone who is disabled, there are a few words and phrases in this
quote that suggest otherwise, which I will get to shortly. To further clarify this quote, I
can share a personal story of the discussion I had with two other blind friends, concerning
the question, “what do you see?” When people ask, “what do you see?” or, “what is it
like to be blind?” we might well here discern an ontological and phenomenological
question of tremendous depth. It is nearly the entire foundation of phenomenological
philosophical discourse. The question of what is reality is a question that has driven
philosophers for 2500 years.
In this example, there were three of us discussing this question, all totally blind.
The manner we were blinded and the degree is slightly different. One friend was blinded
in a car accident from suffering a head injury. Another friend was blinded at birth due to
eye cancer. His eyes were removed at birth. I was blinded at birth by retinal detachment,
but I have a small quantity of light perception. I cannot make out anything I see with it,
but I know what the difference is between light and darkness. The friend who was
blinded in the car accident described his blindness as being darkness to him. It was as
though he were in a darkened movie theater, staring at a darkened screen, waiting for the
picture to begin. He felt and had the sensation of darkness. He was 35 when he was
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blinded. I described the narrow field of light perception that I had, but that I too was
totally blind. Most blind people have some degree of what they call light perception, but
that perception of light does not aid in seeing objects in the physical world. The third
friend when he heard my question, answered with another question. He asked, “What
does your elbow see?” to which I replied, “nothing.” He said, “that is what I see:
nothing.” What he meant is that for him he has no perception of absence. He has no
concept that he is missing vision. He cannot see it is true. But in his experience, he does
not experience the not seeing as missing something. He does experience not seeing. One
has no expectation that your elbow should see anything. It never occurs to one that the
elbow is blind. It is exactly the same for my friend. His phenomenal field cannot be said
to be lacking anything according to his phenomenological experience, or his abilities to
reckon with the possible.
Merleau-Ponty correctly reconstructed and described what it is like for a blind
person to use a cane to help get around. When I, or any other blind person who uses one,
am using a white cane to navigate the world around me, what I am actually doing is
touching the ground ahead of me, feeling the ground to make sure that the next step is a
safe one. You learn to recognize very minute features in the landscape as landmarks, that
give clues to where you are in space with relation to your destination, and give hints on
how far you have traveled according to a kind of internal three-dimensional embodied
map of the given area. It is very important that a blind traveler is aware of how far they
have come, and this internal sense of distance is equally helpful to recognize the location
that you presently occupy. I find counting steps to be of limited use. For me, there seems
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to be an internal pedometer that records and tracks how far I have walked. All of these
features and variations in the landscape and in the surrounding environment are
connected to the person through the cane itself, which is no longer a separate object but is
an extension of that person’s bodily awareness, and it is connected to a person’s
capability of reckoning with the possible. If one has already traveled through this area,
and learned where various places of interest are, those places are variables and elements
that allow for a full range of potential actions and choices. Merleau-Ponty used several
quotes to account for a blind traveler using a cane, and to account for how a human being
experiences three dimensionally certain aspects of the physical world that allow for
reckoning with the possible.
When traveling about in the world, no matter what part of the world you are in,
the body coordinates and arranges the world for you. The world is as deep of familiarity
as your familiarity with using your arms and legs, or their position in space. In order to
first illustrate the bodily familiarity a person has with the world, Merleau-Ponty writes
the following:
When I move about my house, I know without thinking about it that
walking towards the bathroom means passing near the bedroom, that
looking at the window means having the fireplace on my left, and in this
small world each gesture, each perception is immediately located in
relation to a great number of possibilities the body coordinates. …My flat
is, for me, not a set of closely associated images. It remains a familiar
domain round about me only as long as I still have ‘in my hands’ or ‘in my
legs’ the main distances and directions involved, and as long as from my
body intentional threads run out towards it.168
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He writes that he knows without thinking about it. He knows where objects and furniture
are placed in his apartment without thinking about them; and, presumably, without
needing to look every time he passes by them. They are part of his body schema now, and
part of his capacity to reckon with the possible. It is not composed of separate images that
he coordinates in his mind. His world is embodied. It is a continuous Gestalt.
Taylor Carman puts it very clearly when he characterized embodied perception
for Merleau-Ponty when he says, “More simply, to perceive is to have a body, and to
have a body is to inhabit a world.”169 The body is the world. The things in the world are
part of my body. In effect, they are a part of my choices and capacities to reckon with the
possible. This is why, in the case of the blind man’s cane, it ceases to be an object and
appears to become an extension of the embodied perception of the blind person.170
Merleau-Ponty continues to elaborate on this in the following passage:
The blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer
perceived for itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending
the scope and active radius of touch, and providing a parallel to sight. In
the exploration of things, the length of the stick does not enter expressly as
a middle term: the blind man is rather aware of it through the position of
objects than of the position of objects through it. The position of things is
immediately given through the extent of the reach that carries him to it,
and which comprises, besides the arm’s own reach, the stick’s range of
action.171
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When I am using my cane, it becomes transparent for me. Far more than feeling along the
ground with my feet, the cane provides not only tactile two-dimensional sensory
information, but it also provides three-dimensional tactile sensory information. It gives
me a clear idea of my direction and distance in space. It makes it easier for me to walk
straight and to have a clearer understanding of the physical position I take up in the
world. The cane integrates into what Merleau-Ponty calls perceptual synthesis.172
So far, Merleau-Ponty’s words suggest that he has a positive view of disabled
people and their perception, that their perception adds to and strengthens his argument
and his phenomenology. While it may be true that his examples clarify what he means to
say about the body and the person’s being-in-the-world, not everything he says suggests
he views the phenomenological experiences of disabled people as equal to his own.
IV.
Merleau-Ponty uses the case of a traumatically brain-damaged war veteran named
Schneider, and draws upon the case notes of his psychiatrist, Dr. Goldstein. Goldstein
was a Gestalt psychologist. In many ways, Schneider’s deficits and disabilities are
remarkable, contradictory, and difficult to wrap one's mind around. It is interesting that
Schneider can do automatic simple gestures normally, but when told to salute he cannot
do this without looking and carefully arranging his own arms. Merleau-Ponty gives many
cases such as this. Schneider lacks the ability to think abstractly in such a way as to carry
out the required movements in an imaginary situation. Certain simple automatic gestures,
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gestures we could carry out instantly and without thinking, are to him very methodical
and nearly impossible to do. He seems to lack the ability for spontaneous action.173
Schneider can do the basic movements that are habitual to him, or required for him to
maintain himself. He moves as much as he needs to in order to live.
What he cannot do is have abstract thoughts that lead to actual movements
imagining the situation in question.174 He cannot put himself into an imaginary situation,
and carry out the movement, pretending as if he were in that situation. He has to see in
the mirror or he has to watch his other hand in order for him to touch his nose on
command. To perform a military salute, he has to do it with the other hand, as well as
arranging his one hand with the other, in order to watch himself doing it. It takes his
entire body to do the salute. He cannot do it the way you or I would do it by simply
snapping a salute with one hand, as if we were standing at attention. He has lost that
capacity in his brain, and that element of his transcendental field, or the
phenomenological field, is missing in Schneider. Although cognitively aware of the
deficit, Schneider cannot react according to his awareness of that deficit.175
Merleau-Ponty argues that what Schneider lacks is the ability to “reckon with the
possible” as part of his motor skills, and this is what prevents him from doing abstract
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actions in imaginary situations.176 The full range of motor function that a person has
includes the ability to react to the environment, or to react to the perceived and potential
environment. For example, because of Schneider’s brain damage, unless he is acting in a
situation where he is required or expected to go to his psychologist’s house, he is
incapable of recognizing that house outside of that specific situation.177 A person without
the brain damage could walk by his psychologist’s house and recognize that the house
was there. I would be aware of his house’s existence because the possibility potentially
exists that I could walk-in and pay him a visit outside of the expected and planned for
time.178 Although cognitively aware of the deficit, Schneider cannot react according to
his awareness of that deficit.179 Schneider’s intelligence is in no way impaired, since he is
fully cognizant of what the doctors are asking him to do, and he genuinely wants to do it,
but he cannot.180 Clearly, his capacity to interact with the world is seriously impaired, and
Merleau-Ponty sees it as such. Schneider exists on a lower level than a fully able-bodied
person, according to his incapacities to reckon with the possible. It is equally worthy of
note, and very interesting, that 20 years later, according to Moran, two German
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neurologists looked up Schneider. They found that he did not have the disabilities and
deficits any longer that he once had.181 This could either mean that Schneider is
malingering or faking his symptoms, or potentially it could mean that his brain had
healed itself to a point, and at that time doctors would not have recognized the capability
of the human brain to heal itself. In either case, this gravely qualifies the quality of
Merleau-Ponty’s information and sources from which he is deriving the case study.182
No one would dispute that blindness is a severe physical disability. Not being able
to see causes problems in the physical world that are not easily overcome. That in certain
aspects a blind person has fewer choices or capabilities in terms of negotiating the world
cannot be doubted. Once again, remember that my inquiry is not whether or not blindness
is a disability. My inquiry is whether or not Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology allows for
the phenomenal world of a disabled person to be considered equal to that of a fully ablebodied one. A disabled person’s phenomenological world is in fact inferior to that of an
able bodied person, according to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. This is exemplified
when he writes the following:
We conclude that the tactile field has never the fullness of the visual, that
the tactile object is never wholly present in each of its parts as is the case
with the visual object, and in short that touching is not seeing. It is true
that the blind and the normal person talk to each other, and that it is
perhaps impossible to find a single word, even in color vocabulary, to
which the blind man does not manage to attach at least a rough meaning.
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… But such indications remain theoretical and problematic for the blind
person. They ask a question to which only sight could provide an answer.
And this is why the blind person, having undergone his operation, finds
the world different from what he expected, as we always find a man
different from what we have heard about him. The blind man’s world
differs from the normal [sic] person’s not only through the quantity of
material at his disposal, but also through the structure of the whole.183
It cannot be doubted that Merleau-Ponty’s description is accurate. The sense of touch
conveys less information than the sense of sight must. If I am touching something, I only
feel what is immediately under my fingers, according to the breadth of my hand. This
does contradict what Merleau-Ponty argued before.
There are objects in the world which he cannot see all of. Yet, those objects
remain complete in his phenomenological field. If you cannot see the back of the house
because you are standing in front of it that does not mean that this object is incomplete in
your perception. You see it from the front as having a back. Why is it not so that an
object that I am touching can be measured perceptually in the same manner as the house,
for there is no difference between seeing an object incompletely, or touching one
incompletely? It is not always clear from a given passage in The Phenomenology of
Perception whether or not Merleau-Ponty is truly arguing the point he is trying to make,
or if he is attempting to present the opposing view that he means to refute. Merleau-Ponty
rarely makes it clear in his writing which point he is communicating.184 This is one of the
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reasons why The Phenomenology of Perception is such a difficult book to read and
comprehend.
I do, however, believe that in this case he means what he says. Because vision
gives more to the viewer and touch to the blind person, vision gives more opportunities to
interact with the world. Since seeing is a bodily action, and a motor skill, I can only
conclude that Merleau-Ponty sees the absence of that motor skill as being a limiting
factor that degrades the value of a blind person’s phenomenological experience. Indeed,
Merleau-Ponty continues further on in that passage to assert:
The whole significance of our life – from which theoretical significance is merely
extracted – would be different if we were sightless. There is a general function of
substitution and replacement, which enables us to gain access to the abstract
significance of experiences, which we have not actually had, for example, to
speak of what we have not seen. But just as in the organism the renewed functions
are never the exact equivalent of the damaged ones, and give only an appearance
of total restitution, the intelligence ensures no more than an apparent
communication between different experiences, and the synthesis of visual and
tactile worlds in the person who is blind and operated upon, the constitution of an
intercessory world must be effected in the domain of sense itself, the community
of significance between the two experiences being inadequate to ensure their
union in one single experience. The senses are distinct from each other and
distinct from intellection in so far as each one of them brings with it a structure of
being which can never be exactly transposed.185
This leaves even less room for doubt. Not only does he seem to be saying that a blind
person’s phenomenological perceptual experiences are of lesser value than those of a
sighted person, but even if that blind person’s vision is restored to him or her, it can never
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be the equal of being born with perfectly working vision. Somehow, in this case, even if a
person’s vision is granted to them, their phenomenological world is not equal to that of a
person who has had their vision all their life. When he argues that the entire theoretical
significance of reality is changed for a blind person without vision, it seems to suggest
that he means theoretically that a blind person’s understanding of reality, ability to reckon
with the possible, or that person’s being-in-the-world, is inferior to that of a sighted
person. If he believes this, and sees the theoretical observations of the blind
phenomenologist as being unequal to those of a sighted phenomenologist, then while he
has seemed to make advances in phenomenology by demonstrating our embodied being
in the world, he has undermined those advances by arguing this point, and remains like
all other phenomenologists before him. That is, he is ocularcentric and no less caught up
in the discourse of measuring the value of the sense of sight as superior to the lack of it.
V.
The direction of his work after The Phenomenology of Perception is difficult to
predict. His philosophy had taken a new direction in his later works, all agree, but stating
exactly what his purpose may have been is at best a well-supported speculation, at worst
absolute guesswork. Some scholars believe that they can accurately reconstruct his
thought, such as Douglas Lo in, “Merleau-Ponty’s Last Vision.” That Merleau-Ponty was
undeniably an ocularcentric thinker cannot be negated, but the question of those new
directions that he did take in his work remains valid. His concept of the flesh might offer
a “new ontology” of seeing, as Jay argued, but that same novel ontology might remove
the viewing subject entirely.
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What Merleau-Ponty now calls “the flesh” is a state of being in the world where
one is both intertwined by and intertwines with the world.186 In order to see, one must
also be visible. In order to touch something, the object being touched must be touchable,
and in turn the one doing the touching must also be touchable.187 One cannot be both the
toucher and the touched at the same time, however.188 Above all, what Merleau-Ponty
seeks to do is eliminate the idea of subject-object. Yet there is a divergence between the
two. The situation of being touched or touching is reversible, so that if one can touch one
must also allow that one can be touched; if one is looking, then one is also visible and can
be seen.189 It is the reversibility that lends itself to a structure, an intertwining, and an
interconnection that is chiasmic. All dualisms can be seen to be structured chiasmically,
including those of intersubjectivity.190
Taylor Carman points out that intertwining has always been an element of
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, and there is nothing new in this.191 It is the idea of the flesh
that is the revolutionary addition to his thought.192 Carman explains it thus:
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The point is no longer simply that the body, in being aware of the world, is
also always reflexively aware of itself, or that its conscious sensory and
motor capacities are dependent moments of a unified whole. Instead, he
now wants to make the more radical ontological claim that organisms,
conscious or not, just by being alive, are already woven into their
environments, not as minds, or even preminds or protominds, but as flesh,
as both sense and sensibility.193
Merleau-Ponty himself describes the intertwining in light of his renewed emphasis on the
flesh in the following passage:
We have to reject the age-old assumptions that put the body in the world
and the seer in the body, or, conversely, the world and the body in the seer
as in a box. …The world seen is not ‘in’ my body, and my body is not ‘in’
the visible world ultimately: as flesh applied to a flesh, the world neither
surrounds it nor is surrounded by it. A participation in and kinship with the
visible, the vision neither envelops it nor is enveloped by it definitively.
The superficial pellicle of the visible is only for my vision and for my
body. But the depth beneath this surface contains my body and hence
contains my vision. My body as a visible thing is contained within the full
spectacle. But my seeing body subtends this visible body, and all the
visibles with it.194
Merleau-Ponty was never able to fully or satisfactorily express these ideas, since he died
before he could articulate them.195 His working notes, as far as Moran is concerned, leave
little room to fully interpret what he meant to do.196 Still, even keeping that idea in mind,
it must be conceded that his thought would have gone in a very novel direction through
his idea of the flesh had he lived long enough to fully articulate his ideas.
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VI.
Merleau-Ponty recognizes a kind of ascendancy of the other, although he does not
go so far as Levinas does in this acknowledgement. The responsibility that I have for the
other in every way is different from the way Merleau-Ponty understands alterity. He does
acknowledge that we live in the world of the other that is already constructed for us by
the other, not that we construct or constitute the other, as Husserl would have argued.197
Like Levinas, whose work I will be focusing on in the next chapter, Merleau-Ponty
grappled with the concept of the other, intertwined with the subject, and the other’s
otherness. He actually uses the term “alterity,” a term that Levinas would later use.198
But, it is impossible to extrapolate exactly what he intended to do with that concept
conclusively; it is unlikely, in any case, that Merleau-Ponty was headed in the direction
of Levinasian ethics. Unlike Levinas, Merleau-Ponty builds the nature of our relationship
with the other on a kind of solipsistic sameness, since he argues that the only insight we
may have into the consciousness of the other is based on, and built around, our own
experiences in our own bodies that we project upon the other.199 Levinas definitely avoids
treating the Other by way of “sameness with self.”
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the other that he began to build in The Phenomenology
of Perception is built on an ontology of reflection, in that I am better able to empathize
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with the other because I too have a body. He is saying arguably, that we understand the
other because the other is the same as us (again, an emphasis on sameness that we would
not find in Levinas’ treatment of Other). Merleau-Ponty found evidence of this occurring
even among very small children infants. He writes in the following passage:
The other consciousness can be deduced only if the emotional expressions
of others are compared and identified with mine, and precise correlations
recognized between my physical behavior and my ‘psychic events.’ Now
the perception of others is anterior to, and the condition of, such
observations, the observations do not constitute the perception. A baby of
fifteen months opens its mouth if I playfully take one of its fingers
between my teeth and pretend to bite it. And yet it has scarcely looked at
its face in a glass, and its teeth are not in any case like mine. The fact is
that its own mouth and teeth, as it feels them from the inside, are
immediately, for it, an apparatus to bite with, and my jaw, as the baby sees
it from the outside, is immediately, for it, capable of the same
intentions.200
Yet his theories continue to evolve, and by the time of The Visible and the Invisble, he
seems even more sensitive to the idea of alterity. Indeed, Levinas was impressed by and
respectful of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of intersubjectivity.201
In several passages, Levinas praised Merleau-Ponty’s intersubjectivity and its
incarnate subjectivity. Moran cites him in the following passage as follows:
It is difficult for me to find terms adequate to express my admiration for the
subtle beauty of the analyses in Merleau-Ponty’s work of that original
incarnation of mind in which Nature reveals its meaning in movements of
the human body that are essentially signifying, i.e. expressive, i.e.
cultural…the French philosopher’s own quest doubtless permitted him to
say the non-said (of at least the non-published) of Husserl’s thought.202
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Merleau-Ponty ultimately recognized that the alterity of the other is always already
intertwined with me. His response was not that of Emmanuel Levinas, namely replacing
ontology as first philosophy with ethical metaphysics. Merleau-Ponty specifically wanted
to avoid going that route; he did not want the other’s alterity to be elevated to such an
extent as being unknowable, making the other alien and inexpressible.203 There can be no
absolute alterity.204 For Merleau-Ponty, vision is still highly important, and I can only
argue that he remains ocularcentric, albeit in a novel way.
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CHAPTER 4: EMMANUEL LEVINAS: THE TRUE ANTI-OCULARCENTRIC
METAPHYSICIAN
“A person is a person through other persons.”
- Zulu Proverb
If Western philosophy, from its beginning, has been built on a foundation of
ontology as its primary purpose, then ocularcentrism and the use of vision may be called
its primary tools that one may use to research reality and the world. Vision was always
the noblest of the senses, and, as such, has been seen throughout the history of philosophy
as the most accurate and reliable tool one can use to do the research of ontology, second
only, I would argue, to the mind itself. It is the mind that sees after all, not the eye.
Phenomenology restored the centrality of the individual researcher/philosopher as both
the subject and the object of research. As such, the phenomenologists both elevated
vision as a central tool of philosophical exploration, and denigrated the supremacy of the
eyes, as I have outlined in Chapter 2. Although many French thinkers attacked the
supremacy of vision, it was still important and highly relied upon by leading
phenomenological thinkers. Even Merleau-Ponty heavily relied on vision to support and
verify his phenomenological claims. If Martin Jay is right, and Merleau-Ponty did indeed
begin to build the suggestion of a new ontology of seeing, the ontology of seeing that he
sought to build was still ontology.
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I have argued up to this point that the French thinkers who denigrated vision
failed to properly challenge ocularcentrism, and that Merleau-Ponty, although
challenging it, did not succeed in escaping ocularcentrism. He could not have, for the
problem is not ocularcentrism itself as such, but the problem is rather ontology itself.
Removing the site from the researcher, or from that person’s critical exploration of
reality, will not bring one closer to an understanding of reality. It is, in many senses,
equivalent to the argument that nothingness being the opposite of being refutes being, in
that it is nothingness. Nothingness does not refute that there is being; assuming that we
agree such a thing as nothingness both is conceivable and exists, and that nothingness can
only be categorized as the opposite side of the coin. That coin is, metaphorically
speaking, the heads and tails of ontology. Despite his many admirable advances in the
argument, Merleau-Ponty did not, nor did he wish to, break free from phenomenological
ontology. That was never his goal. Emmanuel Levinas, of whom I will be speaking in this
chapter, did want to break free of ontology, and as part of his overall battle strategy
directly challenged ocularcentrism not by blinding it, but by seeking to change the very
purpose behind the looking itself.
In speaking of Emmanuel Levinas, the anti-ocularcentric visionary, I will be
brushing over or briefly touching upon certain of his philosophical/metaphysical ideas. I
have described, in general terms above, what Levinas’ work overall sought to achieve.
His basic intentions I need not repeat in great detail a second time. My purpose in this
chapter is to tell the story of Emmanuel Levinas, the anti-ocularcentric thinker. Of the
select quotes from two of his major works that I will be analyzing, the majority will be
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those in which he downplays vision as a means of understanding reality, downplays
totality, and elevates infinity. His primary purpose was not the refutation of
ocularcentrism in the first place. However, it was a major and primary element of his
thesis that he do so.
If the primary question of ontology can be expressed as, “Why is there something
rather than nothing?” (as in the case of Heidegger) or “what is it?” then the question that
Levinas seeks to ask differs dramatically, because Levinas is not engaging in ontology.
The primary question he asks is, “what am I?”205 or “how does my being justify
itself?”206 How do I justify, in terms of explanation and reason, not in terms of how do I
demonstrate my right to exist, or justify the sense of morality? Levinas seeks to avoid all
traditional ethical discussions or systems of morality, like utilitarianism, or other morally
structured philosophies.207 Phenomenology and perception are a major part of his
exploration, but since his question is not “what is it?” perception does not serve the
purpose of helping him define the physical or mental worlds. His research is grounded in
the interaction with, or the awareness of, the Other, and, more importantly, of my
responsibility for the Other. Above all, he examines the question of, “how do I relate to
the Other?” Levinas does not ask the usual ethical question, one grounded in ontology,
namely, “What do I need to do?” or “What is it best that I do?”208 “What am I?” is not a
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question of ontological importance. “What am I?” stands as how do I define my
subjectivity, my very being in terms of the Other being the source, the foundation, a
teleological root of my existence?
Levinas is considered difficult by many critics due to his writing style, even
among such impenetrable writers as Derrida and Heidegger.209 Moran laments that
Levinas makes assertion after assertion without backing them up, and goes from one
metaphor to the next without unpacking them. Furthermore, when he seems to speak
ethically, one cannot tell if he means to speak of what is ethically a description of the way
the world actually is, or if he is speaking of how he would like the world to be.210 Moran
also levels a fairly serious charge at Levinas, namely that he is straying into mysticism as
a result of the obscurity and contradictory style of his prose;211 this charge would
certainly not sit well with Levinas, who is very critical of mysticism. Below I will
demonstrate why this is the case.
Mysticism, although it may speak of otherworldly entities and the inability to
comprehend interacting with them, is merely another form of ontology.212 Furthermore,
claims such as “Ethics is an optics” can be very difficult to understand.213 Even Simon
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Critchley admitted in a panel discussion, that Levinas’ writing has a wildness and
unpredictability about it. It holds a spontaneity in it that suggests Levinas is not always
conscious of what he is doing in his work, that not every word or image is deliberately
planned.214 It may be that sometimes he is as if taken by the spirit and swept along by
inspiration. Such a statement as, “Ethics is an optics,” then, holds a mystery worth
exploring before we move ahead. While he does not mean that ethics and ethical
questions are somehow visible, he does mean to say that the outlook of a person can
change when she comes under the grip of the ethical picture of herself.215 The way one
sees, and the focus of the seeing, changes because the intention behind the seeing leads
one to look for a different purpose. One would be looking with the purpose that is aimed
toward satisfying the needs of the other, not for satisfying one’s self. Levinas is no more
in favor of blinding the eye, than he is of throwing away totality so that there is only
infinity. We still need totality. We must still live in the world. His phenomenology is not
utopian. He seeks to account for the fact that there is ever any semblance of ethics at all,
that there ever is an “after you, sir” in the first place.216
Levinas juxtaposes seeing and hearing in the same way that he juxtaposes totality
and infinity. If we are attentive to literally seeing the physical face of the other and the
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features of that face, we are not actually seeing the Other at all.217 A more direct
connection to the Other, one that allows for the infinity and for the irreducibility of the
Other, is available through hearing.218 Seeing belongs to the ontology of totalization.
Speech is the way Levinas sees my building a connection with the other.219 Yet, like
other aspects of relating to the Other as Other, no actual words need be exchanged; the
call is still upon me in its fullest power, as though I were compelled in the strongest terms
by the most intensely spoken words, but none are necessarily spoken.220 Below, I will cite
specifically a very lucid quotation by Levinas that demonstrates the place of vision in
totality, and give it a closer reading.
There are two opposing modalities throughout Western philosophical history, as
pointed out by John Wild in the Preface of Totality and Infinity: one is the totalizers, the
other the infinitizers.221 The philosophy of the totalizers has predominantly ruled the day
in Western metaphysics. Levinas is one of the only thinkers who challenges totality with
the infinite.222 In a totalizing system of thought, Wild writes, “The real is something that
can be brought before the senses and the mind as an object. The acts of sensing, thinking,
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existing, as they are lived through, are discounted as subjective. A priority is, therefore,
placed on objective thinking…”223 There is an aversion or an allergy to alterity, or for
difference in Western thought.224 From the earliest philosophers, especially Plato, to
Heidegger’s being-in-the-world, there is a movement towards totality, towards making
everything, either through thought or through dialectic, so that all objects and ideas fall
into the category of sameness.225
For Levinas, ontology cannot be first philosophy, for it has no way of grounding
anything other than interpersonal and political violence.226 Ontology, as first philosophy,
leads to the making of Other into sameness, not by agreement or consent, but by force
and by subjugation.227 Placing ethics as first philosophy does not mean he prescribes a
code of conduct to us which we should follow. Rather, by placing the otherness of the
Other as more important than me, or more important than making the Other into the
same, the disruption the Other causes me and the surprise the disruptive Other causes me,
is the truest sign of freedom for me and for the other.228 By juxtaposing the reverse
relationship as a kind of mirror image to ontology, Levinas demonstrates that such a
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juxtaposed relation can allow for the possibility of nonviolence. Ontology creates only
the possibility for a cessation of violence between violent periods.229 In this juxtaposed
relationship, there is no collision, coercion, violence, or transformation of the other into
the same, since in the transcendence of the face-to-face relation, one can neither touch
nor be internally touched, by the Other.230
The very calling into question of my sameness, of my control, is itself the ethics
that Levinas wishes to place as first philosophy, not the ontological drive for more
control, more knowledge, more domination of my world, and those who share it with
me.231 In spite of this, I further point out that since the Other is the foundation of my
subjectivity, this foundation is the case whether I recognize or react to the other as other
in a manner that would be expected, that I am somehow moved by the presence of the
Other as Other. It is also the case that this relation affects me even if I never recognize
the Other as Other, and even if I never feel the influence of the Other working upon me,
as if the other were like a “Mysterium tremendum” that has a dramatic effect upon me.232
In relation to this, Levinas said very clearly in a radio interview the following:
…The tie with the Other is knotted only as responsibility, this moreover,
whether accepted or refused, whether knowing or not knowing how to
assume it, whether able or unable to do something concrete for the Other.
To say: here I am … To do something for the Other. To give. To be a
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human spirit, that's it. The incarnation of human subjectivity guarantees its
spirituality…233
The interaction with the Other could be mundane and unrecognized, and this is the
foundation of my subjectivity and freedom. Yet, for Heidegger, freedom is not simply
doing what I want when I want it, but it is my aligning myself with Being, and as the next
step, making the Other mine.234 Levinas calls vision, “The grasp before the grasp.”235
Whether or not the seeing is literal or metaphorical, seeing and thereby knowing is
possessing and grasping, which is ultimately controlling. It is a requirement for Levinas
to battle against ocularcentrism to overcome ontology. Ocularcentrism is the primary tool
one uses to enact ontology upon the world.
Levinas replied to an interviewer’s question in a radio interview when he asked
him about seeing the face this way: “I do not know if one can speak of a
‘phenomenology’ of the face, since phenomenology describes what appears.”236 There is
no seeing the face, and experiencing it as a phenomenologically definable experience.
One does not experience the phenomenon of the face, since phenomenon implies
experiencing something with your senses. Although he is using the methodology of
phenomenology, Levinas is not an ordinary phenomenologist, since subjectivity of my
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being and my relation to the Other are not conveyed through phenomenological
experience.237 Levinas claims some allegiance to phenomenology, stating that he is in
fact doing phenomenology, according to Moran, but in other ways he severs himself from
it.238
Levinas saw that phenomenology freed philosophers from merely discussing
psychic states, as in Descartes, and created a restored place for human beings dwelling in
the world, experiencing the world as human beings, and overcoming the dehumanizing
ontologies that came before.239 With the advent of phenomenology, humankind is no
longer an isolated ego standing apart from the world, but rather is seen as part of the
world. Consciousness is restored to meaningful content, since it is the consciousness of
something, due to the Husserlian transcendental phenomenological reduction.240 But
phenomenology falls short, since it is a branch of ontology.241 Phenomenology for
Levinas is simply one more totality amidst the mass of Western philosophical thought.242
For Levinas, Husserlian intentionality errs when it leads to a system of representation and
adequation, where the thoughts that we have are representations of the objects we see in
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the world, and, like previous philosophical ontologies, it seeks to totalize and possess
everything.243 Moran explains this in greater depth in the following passage:
He [Levinas] is constantly challenging the Husserlian conception of
philosophy as a rigorous science, itself the logical outcome of the whole
tradition of Western philosophy. In trying to break through the stranglehold
of ‘totality,’ Levinas evokes experiences of the unbounded and indeed
infinite nature of the ‘other.’ For Levinas, that which challenges the sphere
of totality may be understood as ‘transcendence,’ the ‘other,’ and ‘the
infinite’; and Levinas may be seen as trying to open up phenomenology to
describe this transcendent dimension of human experience.244
When we come across such terms, then, as “transcendence” or “infinite,” it needs to be
kept in mind that Levinas does not mean what others might mean in speaking of an
interaction with separate otherworldly forces from another reality. We need to keep in
mind that Levinas defines all of these terms in the context of relations with other human
beings, and our responsibility towards them.245
Levinas continues to explain this connectivity to other human beings. This time
he focuses on the visible, and that it cannot be known either, since knowing is seeing.
Levinas writes the following:
I think rather that access to the face is straightaway ethical. You turn
yourself toward the Other as toward an object when you see a nose, eyes, a
forehead, a chin, and you can describe them. The best way of encountering
the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes! When one observes the
color of the eyes one is not in social relationship with the Other. The
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relation with the face can surely be dominated by perception, but what is
specifically the face is what cannot be reduced to that.246
One still sees, but the seeing does not convey the thing in itself. The face is not contained
or containable in the seen or in the comprehended. He means more than do not judge
people because of how they look. How the person looks is not in any way related to the
Otherness of the person that commands me and calls me into question. He adds in that
same interview, that the face is the most naked part of a human being. Ironically, we try
to hide its nakedness from ourselves and from each other, according to the context of our
social roles in society.247 The naked face, unconcealed by context or by social roles,
cannot be defined, and by that, it cannot be contained. It is more than what one sees.
Vision, for Levinas, is not a connection or relation to the Other. Vision is the force that
absorbs being, the tool of totalization.248
All of our senses are classified and called seeing, even if we mean touch. Levinas
points out that from Saint Augustine to Heidegger himself, this fact is recognized, that
vision is what we always speak of whenever we see, feel, or understand something.249
The thoughts of the person are unchanged by the status of the person looking; whether he
or she is blind has no relevance to the ultimately ontological state of seeing. However,
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from my standpoint as a blind phenomenologist, it is true that I am perhaps less distracted
by who or what I see, or rather, do not see. This lack of distraction may open an
opportunity for us to penetrate and more deeply understand Levinas’ concept. Seeing, we
cannot help but look. By looking, we cannot help but unconsciously engage in an
ontology of totality. In this way, a person is, without regard to his or her qualities as a
thinker, trapped or swayed by the ontological dynamic that we practice, built upon the
foundation of vision.
Personally, I do not feel the absence of knowing what someone’s face looks like,
and I find that I have no need to know what someone’s face looks like. I do not need to
touch their face in order to feel as though I am connected to – or for Levinas, commanded
by – that person. On occasion I have, but touching someone’s face in that case is more of
an exercise in curiosity than an exercise in the need to know. Still, as we have classified
seeing and touching as falling under seeing, the blind person is still locked in an
ontological paradigm. It is not an escape for me simply to say that I cannot see, therefore
I am better able than my sighted counterpart to appreciate my ethical relation to the
Other. It is not true. On the one hand, for Levinas we are all already ethically constituted
by the Other; and, on the other hand for Levinas, we all are required to better live in the
world in light of that fact. Blindness does not automatically give me an advantage on
either front. Blindness does not necessarily give me a leg up on other human beings,
although it does provide me a world without the visual distraction in this case, if one may
call it such. Vision allows one to see an object as given, and to grasp that object; it does
not give an actual connection, but allows one to expand my interaction with and control
102

over anything that I possess as the same.250 Vision and light in and of themselves do not
open one up to transcend one’s self. Vision is the connection of the same to the same,
giving me the ability to acquire objects, and, Levinas further elaborates, allowing for
consciousness to hide from the infinite, to flee from the infinite within the act of seeing,
and of grasping.251 Since a genuine connection with another human being as the Other is
beyond what we sense, or what we do not sense, the connection would be a more fully
embodied one (at once infinite and concrete), and fully realized by my mere subjectivity,
even if I do not react or acknowledge this state of relation.
But, the face demands a response. It calls upon me, first demanding that I do not
kill.252 The presence of the naked face before me exerts control upon me, and, as if
speaking, its demands cannot be denied. They can be resisted or disobeyed; killing
happens all the time. But, the demand is no less for it is being silent, and no less infinite
because of this. My connection and obligation to the Other is not an exchange between
equals. I am unequal to the Other.253 Levinas takes as an example the Cartesian idea of
the infinite. He learned from the Cartesian example that he sees the idea of the infinite,
that we even have a thought that there is such a thing, even though the thought of the idea
of the infinite cannot contain the actuality of the infinite, to apply a similar construction
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to the face of the Other. But, if there were in no way any such thing as the infinity of
God, there would be no thought at all about the potential infinity of God.254 For Levinas,
the face has an infinite nature, beyond the boundaries of what we can know or see. He
described the greater ethical implications of this in the following passage:
I think that whatever the motivation which explains this inversion, the
analysis of the face such as I have just made, with the mastery of the Other
and his poverty, with my submission and my wealth, is primary. It is the
presupposed in all human relationships. If it were not that, we would not
even say, before an open door, ‘After you, sir!’ It is an original ‘After you,
sir!’ that I have tried to describe. You have spoken of the passion of hate. I
feared a much graver objection: How is it that one can punish and repress?
How is it that there is justice? I answer that it is the fact of the multiplicity
of men and the presence of someone else next to the Other, which
condition the laws and establish justice. If I am alone with the Other, I owe
him everything; but there is someone else. Do I know what my neighbor is
in relation to someone else? Do I know if someone else has an
understanding with him or his victim? Who is my neighbor?255
The face does not give itself to me or to my vision the way objects in the world
are given,256 the same way that the Gestalt thinkers and Merleau-Ponty saw objects in the
world as being accessible to them because they were given to them and gave themselves
to them. The world belongs to the one who sees it. It actively gives itself to the viewer.
This is not true in the case of seeing the face. When one sees the face, it has no clear and
direct relevance to either my ethical relation to it, or to its infinite status. The
characteristics and physical qualities of the face that separate the person from me in basic
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aspects of appearance or of race or of sex in no way lends to the face its quality of infinite
irreducible nature,257 and we cannot classify the irreducibility of the face according to its
racial or physical characteristics and qualities. Although these differences and qualities
do exist, they have no relevance for Levinas’ main ethical point. I would go so far as to
argue that neither does seeing the face have relevance. If the face is not prevented from
reaching the status of being infinite, irreducible, and not giving itself to me if I see it, then
I must equally assume that in my not seeing it the qualities of the face are in no way
blocked or altered. It is still infinite. It still does not give itself to me or lend itself to my
power. The face is still irreducible and infinite beyond my ability to categorize, classify,
or control. Thus, if vision does not have relevance in a direct fashion, neither then does
blindness. Blindness is no more or less a means of interacting with the face. My
interaction with the alterity of the Other exceeds and transcends my capacity to see the
face’s characteristics, or my lack of capacity to see the face. In short, speaking more
generally, blindness does not hinder or aid me in discerning the nature of subjectivity, nor
in escaping ocularcentric discourse or realities, in both the natural and the ontological
sense. By not disadvantaging the blind person in any way, Levinas’ ethics offer an
avenue by which a thinker may overcome ocularcentrism and ontology.
However, here we have a paradox. The face is in fact graspable, since the face can
be seen and touched.258 The fact that it exists in physical space and can be discerned
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within our five senses means that the face is indeed graspable, especially seeing as my
vision is the first way that I grasp at a given object. The face does not resist my power by
exerting greater strength upon me, and overthrowing my will. Rather, the face exists as
an epiphany according to Levinas.259 This epiphany opens onto a higher reality, which
negates, or to put it another way, maybe ignores, the power that I possess to control or
hold it.260 It exceeds my grasp because it exceeds the bounds of the known (and seen)
world. It stands high above the rest of the world. Yet, this is a paradox because before I
said even though it can be seen or cannot be seen, the seeing or the not seeing has no
effect on it.
In order for it to be beyond the grasp, the possession, or the reduction that I would
cast upon it, in some way or other, the face must be vulnerable to me;261 the face is naked
before me. Even though its first commandment is, “Thou shall not kill,” I can murder that
person. The face of the person in the physical sense can be completely annihilated. But if
I killed that person that does not mean I have grasped, possessed, or reduced the face. It
only means that person is vulnerable to annihilation,262 in that the person before me is
naked and vulnerable to annihilation; she is destitute. As Levinas says throughout his
work, the Other is the widow and the orphan. The impoverishment of the face is also
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what renders its height above me. It also lends to it the power of its infinity and its
demands upon me.263
Vision is not a reasonable or actual way to connect with the Other as Other in a
manner where their otherness remains undiminished and irreducible. The nature of vision
demands obtainment, wherein objects are acquired and controlled, and in the case of
human beings made into creatures that represent sameness and not irreducible otherness.
Vision is not the medium through which the Other throws me into question, disrupting
my power and control. Vision is, as it were, the beacon of the lighthouse through which
the ontology of the lighthouse keeper will see to it that every vessel makes it into the
harbor. The way we see, and are expected to see, is founded by, and indicative of, the
totality under which we all live and labor. For Levinas, the first act of discourse, which
will lead truly to one’s freedom, is through speech—an idea which leads him to speak of
a Jewish focus on “hearing” over and above “seeing.” Obviously, a blind
phenomenologist may have an element that is advantageous in this regard. For instance, I
do not associate visual appearance or physicality with the people that I know. To me, the
person’s voice is the strongest identification of that person as a being expressing
themselves, not their face. As I have said previously, the actual appearance of the face
that I may comprehend, either tactilely or visually, has little to no meaning for me. Seeing
that the voice is the primary characteristic that I associate with people, speech is of the
highest importance to me. In a number of obvious and not so obvious ways, the shared
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reality and meanings (and, for Levinas, disruptiveness) of words is the primary vehicle
through which I interact with people. They serve as the primary creator of my reality.
For Levinas, speech is either the beginning of, or is a means through which the
otherness of the person can be expressed as otherness irreducible and unchanged. Levinas
writes the following:
…Better than comprehension, discourse relates with what remains
essentially transcendent…Words are said, be it only by the silence kept,
whose weight acknowledges this evasion of the Other. The knowledge that
absorbs the Other is forthwith situated within the discourse I address to
him. Speaking, rather than ‘letting be,’ solicits the Other. Speech cuts
across vision. In knowledge or vision the object seen can indeed determine
an act, but it is an act that in some way appropriates the ‘seen’ to itself,
integrates it into a world by endowing it with a signification, and, in the last
analysis, constitutes it.264
In his ethical sense of speech (tied elsewhere to an ethical sense of hearing), one need not
actually speak out loud for there to be a command spoken.265 It is significant, in that he is
not elevating an alternative sense over that of vision. Nor is he suggesting the means of
conquering ocularcentric ontology is through blinding the seeing eye. He gives
alternative actions, not alternative senses. He suggests that speech transcends the limits of
vision. Speech does not force the Other into becoming the same necessarily.
It should be additionally pointed out that knowledge is as often stored in the form
of words as it is in embodied cognition. Levinas cites Merleau-Ponty and his “I CAN” of
the body. In fact, working in general with a highly concrete, embodied sense of
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subjectivity, Levinas agrees with Merleau-Ponty that speech does not reflect our internal
thought patterns or some internal thinking entity separate from the body.266 He agrees
with Merleau-Ponty that speaking is an embodied action that is automatic and responsive
in its nature. Speaking is merely another embodied coping with the world.267 In this case
the world, with regard to the speaking and the reaction elicited, is composed of the words
of the Other. But words are important because they communicate, and because the words
spoken by the Other put me into question, the kind of question that leads to feeling the
demand of the Other’s infinity.268 Yet, the Other speaks to me without speaking, and
beyond speaking. His calling me into question occurs even if he never says a word to me,
or even if I am never made aware of his call.
The meaning of the words, or the information that the words convey on the
surface, is not the reason that one is confronted by the Other in his infinite need and
solicitude.269 The words do not communicate from the interior of an infinite entity, or
they do not contain the essence of an infinite Other by their meaning in the message that
they convey. Neither do the words reflect the inner cogito in the way that the Cartesians
believe, indicating a separated mind carried by the body. That is not what Levinas means

Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1969), 205-206.
266

267

Ibid., 206-207.

268

Ibid., 195.

269

Ibid., 200.

109

by interior. It is the fact that the Other is invoking me and revealing vulnerability to me,
which I cannot refuse to hear.270 Levinas said in a radio interview the following:
Certainly. Face and discourse are tied. The face speaks. It speaks, it is in
this that it renders possible and begins all discourse. I have just refused the
notion of vision to describe the authentic relationship with the Other; it is
discourse and, more exactly, response or responsibility which is this
authentic relationship.271
For the remainder of this chapter, I will be drawing from the essay “Substitution,”
but I will be using two different drafts. The first draft was published in 1968 after having
been given as a lecture in 1967, and appears in the book Basic Philosophical Writings,
where the original draft of the essay was published.272 It was considered by the editors
and translators to be a somewhat more easily accessible version of this essay.273
Nonetheless, as freely admitted by the translators, the essay is exceptionally difficult. The
second draft of this essay from which I will be drawing appears as Chapter 4 in Levinas’
1974 work, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. This draft has significant
differences in language and in concept from the former draft, but topically is the same. It
is the focal chapter for Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. In this chapter, Levinas
responds to the insight of Jacques Derrida, when he pointed out that although Levinas
attempted to critique and escape from ontology in Totality and Infinity, he nonetheless
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continued to use ontological terminology and definitions. Thus, he failed to properly
refute or escape from Heidegger’s ontology.
Robert Bernasconi also points out that there is no critical or scholarly consensus
as to what question Levinas seeks to address beyond a response to Derrida.274 But, that
does not mean there are not answers or suggestions of answers. Levinas does not seek to
moralize, or suggest how we should behave to make a better world. Rather, he attempts to
account for the fact that there is, under any circumstances, any suggestion or semblance
of morality to begin with.275 Although Hobbes and Hegel are sometimes targets of his
counterattack, it is, as always, Heidegger who is the primary focus against whom Levinas
is fighting.276 Even Derrida, against whose seeming critique he responds to in the essay,
cannot be said to be attacking or refuting Levinas.277 I tend to think of Derrida’s Violence
and Metaphysics, in light of the fact that Derrida does not mean to demolish Levinas, as a
kind of philosophical dance. Although the flaws in Levinas’ Totality and Infinity are
arguably as Derrida said they were (an assessment with which Levinas ultimately
agreed), it was not meant to undermine or refute Levinas’ work. I see it as a dance that
Derrida conducts with Levinas, instead of an attack, because it was Derrida’s work that
may have given Levinas the means to truly achieve his purpose and break free of
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ontology. I would be willing to wager that Levinas already knew his work had not fully
succeeded in overcoming the ontological paradigm, and that he was still confined to, and
using, ontological language to argue his point.
One aspect of the human phenomena that Levinas explores in his work is the fact
that there ever is, under any circumstance, a situation where someone holds the door for
someone else and says, “After you, Sir,” or Madam, as the case may be. Or, additionally,
the fact that there even remotely exists the potential, or the possibility, for such a thing to
occur as the ‘After you, Sir’ in this world in the first place.278 If the egoistic self were at
its heart “me first” purely egoistic, then this should be under any conditions an
impossibility,279 even if self-interest suggests kindness it would get us further than
unkindness. Levinas argues that at the heart of subjectivity, instead of selfishness, there is
the one for the Other, or the substitution.280 The relationship is asymmetrical, since one
takes responsibility for the other’s responsibilities completely, and even for the past
decisions or future decisions of the Other.281 Western ethical discussions tend to place
more weight on legality and assignment of fault than what Levinas is trying to do.282
Indeed, this placing of blame would be in keeping with the ontological nature of Western
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philosophy and metaphysics. What Levinas describes is simply how reality is. He
describes what the subject is according to his metaphysics. I am responsible for the Other,
whether or not I choose to act on it, or whether or not I am capable of acting on it,
because at the core of subjectivity, there is the one for the Other.
In the essay “Substitution,” Levinas advances his concept of responsibility to
include all levels of responsibility, and the I is fully disrupted. This is unlike Totality and
Infinity, wherein Levinas only recognized by the end of the book that the Other had an
absolute claim through fecundity. In this case, responsibility encompasses everything,
meaning I am responsible even for my enemies, for their persecution of me, and I am
responsible for their seeming sense of responsibility, or lack thereof. Levinas attempts to
rewrite the ontological language that he was previously adopting in Totality and Infinity.
His wish is to fully escape ontology and to redefine how the I is seen in philosophical
terms, breaking free of philosophical terms entirely. But, Levinas has magnified the sense
of responsibility to the point where I am held hostage by my responsibility for the
Other.283
Levinas states in a very significant passage found in Basic Philosophical Writings
in the essay, “Substitution,” a quote that I will help clarify with commentary, and that
succinctly explains what the nature of the relation of self to the Other is, and what
relational elements subjectivity consists of. He begins by saying that, “Proximity is a
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relationship with what cannot be resolved into ‘images’ and exposed.”284 Clearly, the
word “proximity” is not being used in the usual sense. Normally, it means something is
close by, but in this case the usual meaning of the word could not be further from the
meaning with which it is here being imbued. Proximity is representative of the
subjectivity relating to something that cannot be defined, sensed, comprehended, or
thematized. The words that Levinas most often uses are not to be understood in their
conventional meaning. There are a number of words whose meaning has been changed in
order to fit the point that Levinas wishes to make. In this case, the relationship cannot be
exposed, which means defined, and it cannot be known or perceived. The presence of the
Other and, by extension, the summons of the Other, are not perceivable in conscious
experience. Although one is unaware consciously of the alterity of the Other,
consciousness is still displaced and called into question by the Other, and the person may
not consciously be aware of the source of the summons.285 The relationship cannot be
resolved, which means it cannot be categorized or understood, and I cannot react to it as
if it were a relation that is definable in terms of traditional relation.
Levinas continues in this vein when he writes, “It is a relationship not with what
is inordinate with respect to a theme but with what is incommensurable with it; with what
cannot be identified in the kerygmatic logos, frustrating any schematism.”286 This is a
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relationship that is otherwise than being. It is outside of our categorization of being and
not being, and it is outside of our categorization of human and superhuman.287 This is not
a case of being touched by an Other of mystical and indefinable proportions. It is not a
case of the super being.288 In and of itself, the ethical situation that one finds oneself in is
concrete, that is it is real, in spite of the fact that the Other cannot be sensed, perceived, or
thematized.289 Yet, this relationship is considered a transcendent one, even though
Levinas does not mean one is interacting with a power-as-presence – for example, a
traditional notion of God – that exceeds my boundaries and dimensions, as in the case of
Descartes.290 Descartes had a kind of mystical connection with the divine as a “being
beyond being,” so to speak, since he understood that the thought of the divine
exemplified the fact that such a being had to exist, in order to plant the thought of divinity
in his mind. The relationship actually is transcendent, according to Levinas, but too often
Western thought has mistakenly envisioned the transcendent as a “super-being,” and has
in that spirit called the transcendent mystical.291
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It is not a case of what Anthony Steinbock calls, “Vertical Givenness,” a state that
elevates a person and leaves them with the very definite awareness that they are touched
by a significant relationship, either with the divine or with an individual.292 In the case of
the mystics that Steinbock highlights in his phenomenological analysis of verticality
against idolatry, those mystics had a very definite awareness that they were touched by
the divine and moved to change by that connection.293 Logos, in this, does not proclaim
itself, not because it chooses not to, or feels no need to, but because the ethical relation
stands outside any totality and is of an entirely different paradigm—one otherwise than
being, not simply “a being above being” – that cannot be readily categorized in terms of
Western spirituality or mysticism.294 There is no way, in this case, that somebody can
concentrate and look very hard to distinguish the Other as Other, and thereby categorize
that Other. Western traditions have largely ignored the needs for the definition of the
Other, with the exception of a few mystics who have attempted to describe the Otherness
of the Other, even though that Other is beyond description. In these cases, mystics are
describing God as the ultimate Other, and not other human beings in their alterity. The
Other is not another me, but another who is completely different in form from me. The
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Other could be not just an alien human being. The Other could be the past or the future
version of me.295
Mystics, on the other hand, although the breadth and infinite alienness of what
they are attempting to describe is elusive, do resort to imagery – related to a sense of a
being or presence “above ordinary being” – in order to explain their encounters with the
divine. Anthony Steinbock explains in the following passage:
It is due to a kind of presence that is experienced as overwhelming from
their side as finite persons that the mystics are motivated to eloquence and
imagery. It is not that there is somewhere an ‘adequate’ language, and
imagery and metaphor are a second best. Rather, for the mystics, imagery
and metaphor suggest at least an implicit awareness of language’s own
limits; and to the extent that it (imagery) is aware of its (language’s) own
insufficiency at indicating or provoking the Holy (e.g., ‘this is God’),
imagery becomes for the mystics a ‘superior’ mode of language. Imagery,
in this regard, is perhaps less naive than philosophical discourse.296
So, in spite of the vastness and difficulty in defining the divine, even something as
unknowable and mysterious as the divine can be understood as a presence, which is not
the case of the alterity of the Other. Logos, it would seem, is a totalizing ontology that
defines everything by reason, even the nature of the divine.297 Levinas continues,
“Incapable of remaining in a theme and of appearing, this invisibility that becomes
contact…”298 This is a description of how Levinas sees the ethical relation. There is, in
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the ethical, no point of awareness at all, “invisible,” but I am entirely responsible and
bound even by that which I cannot perceive, “contact.” The Other is the absolute
epiphany that breaks the world, and, even if I speak with the Other, and the Other speaks
to me, he (or she) does not descend to my level, and his (or her) infinite alterity remains
unchanged. The Other still transcends me.299
Levinas also continues, “… this invisibility that becomes contact does not result
from the nonsignifyingness of what is approached but rather from a way of signifying
wholly other than that of exhibition from a beyond of the visible.”300 This is an approach
entirely outside of being and ontology and cannot be defined in those terms.301 The
beyond, in this case, does not mean from beyond the veil, or from another dimension, as
one might suspect one would feel if he or she was interacting with the divine as a
presence, albeit a “super-being” sort of presence above ordinary being.302 It is neither a
person nor presence, and is, as such, not available to ontology or logos, words or
definitions. And, Levinas adds in that regard, “Not that the ‘beyond’ would be ‘further’
than everything that appears, or ‘present in absence,’ or revealed by a symbol, which
would again be to submit to a principle and to give oneself to consciousness.”303 It is not

299

Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), 346.

Emmanuel Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1996), 80.
300

301

Sarah Pessin, Private Conversation, Spring 2016.

302

Ibid.

Emmanuel Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1996), 80.
303

118

even revealed by what it is not. It cannot be defined ontologically by the absence of the
defining qualities of the Other, according to what he does not have, and the Other
originates from a place beyond ontology; it is not, in other words, an “absence-presence.”
It is not subject to ontology, and can, as such, not even be understood according to what it
is not. It is completely outside all categorization. One is incapable of capturing it using
words, imagery, or metaphor.
There is no way, not even through speech, to categorize or contain the Other. We
have previously determined that speech is not merely the communication of information
from one mind to another, nor is touching merely the physical act of touching. The act of
touching is a caress. These words and actions exceed the normal interpretation of their
content, and thus we may infer that any visual imagery that we see is interpreted not in
the context of the information communicated to the seer, but that it is instead interpreted
in this higher context, that is of connection and exchange that exceeds the finite
dimensions to which we are ordinarily subject.304 This almost tantalizingly suggests to
me that the fact that one sees is irrelevant, and one may as well be blind for all that the
seeing can benefit the viewer. Since what is being seen of the Other cannot be broken
down or defined or signified according to the definitions that we might use to define or
encompass what we look at, then what is being seen can no longer be defined and no
longer has definition.
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In that case, the viewer may as well not be seeing the Other at all. This is a step
further in the direction of declaring vision useless or even undesirable, in that now seeing
is completely pointless to the ethical reality of human subjectivity. It is not an exceeded
finite dimension; now it is an incomprehensible, invisible blur. The way of seeing,
however, as implied by Levinas in the previously cited passage, suggests that seeing may
still be plausible or possible, if the viewer is looking with a different intention, and/or is
seeing in a manner that does not require signification, definition, or the conversion of
what is being seen into symbolic information conveyed by words and signifiers, as in
logos. The Other is now seen in such a context that they are indestructible, irreducible,
and indefinable. This is much the way in which Levinas spoke of vision in Totality and
Infinity, only with far greater emphasis on the irreducibility, uncontainability, and
indestructible nature of the Other. Levinas has gone to a place even further away from
vision in “Substitution” than he had previously expressed in Totality and Infinity, and is,
if anything, even less visual in this case than he was before.305
If seeing is a kind of consumption or digestion, wherein the Other is broken down
into categories, concepts, and themes by the viewer, then the majestic quality of the Other
defies definition completely. This is more extreme then in his previous work because at
least in his previous work he recognizes that one may see the face of the Other as a face,
and define it in such terms. Now, however, nothing can be applied to the definition of the
Other, the one looked out and seen. It surpasses comprehension in all aspects. Indeed, it
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is the Other’s refusal to be defined or interrogated by logos that gives the Other such a
majestic standing with regard to me in my attempt to see.306 The face is an abstract entity;
it is signification itself. The face is not a phenomenon that one can experience, it is not
even experience per se.307 Moran expresses this when he writes the following:
Levinas does not mean that ethics takes on a special personal significance
when we look at the Other directly in the face. Looking at the face in that
sense is a kind of reification for Levinas. In fact, the ‘face’ in Levinas’s
sense escapes phenomenality altogether. He repeatedly emphasizes that the
face escapes sight: ‘It cannot be comprehended, that is encompassed’ …308
Unlike those experiences highlighted by Steinbach, those interactions with the divine that
can be analyzed through a phenomenological methodology, the experience Levinas
speaks of is not phenomenological in any ordinary sense.309 In the face of this challenge,
the I or the ego is rendered incapable of speech, or of thought.310
That subjective quality, which I call myself, cannot withstand such a challenge,
and maintain itself as itself when confronted by the Other. It is this state of seemingly
complete annihilation in the present, and even in relation to the past, it is this state of
overthrownness which Levinas refers to as “persecution.”311 As stated above, this is not
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an issue of legality or politics in a manner that we may understand such things. In other
words, I am not literally being subjected to brutality and persecution by the Other.
Levinas is not suggesting that this is what he condones in as far as the behavior of the
Other towards myself. It is this state of absolute annihilation, and removal from any
categorization one may call upon for self-definition or defense, that he means to say is the
persecution by the Otherness of the Other that grounds me as a self-for-another.
Levinas discusses this in the previously cited radio interview. He states in the
following passage:
I analyze the inter-human relationship as if, in proximity with the Other –
beyond the image I myself make of the other man – his face, the expressive
in the Other (and the whole human body is in this sense more or less face),
were what ordains me to serve him. I employ this extreme formulation. The
face orders and ordains me. Its signification is an order signified. To be
precise, if the face signifies an order in my regard, this is not in the manner
in which an ordinary sign signifies its signified; this order is the very
signifyingness of the face.312
The essence of the face with regard to me is defined by its effect upon me. It is therefore
unbounded by imagery, by definitions, and by expectations. Even in my reaction to the
presence of the Other, there is an undefinability and unthinkability with regard to it. The
face exerts a call upon me, one that demands a response that I am forced to give, whether
or not I speak the words or act accordingly.313 Levinas explains that the relationship is
asymmetrical, and that the response it requires from me is as infinite as the face is infinite
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in my inability to categorize, or seemingly to ingest it. Dostoyevsky, in a favorite quote
that Levinas cites more than once, states how guilty I am before all others, and that as
humans we are all guilty before the Other, but none more so than myself. This does not
mean that I am in actuality guilty, or being persecuted as such, either for a criminal act or
for being part of an oppressed group, but rather it signifies the heaviness of my
responsibility for the Other, and is indicative of the call that is placed upon me, a call as if
someone were asking for you.314
My response is best signified by the Hebrew term hineni, which means, “here I
am.” It is the accusative “me” that is directly addressed by the Otherness of the Other.315
Levinas wishes to draw upon this Biblical term (an utterance made by various prophets in
response to God’s call) to elevate his explication of the response to the Other which I
give automatically and without regard to the context of the present situation in which I
interact with the Other.316 The word occurs 178 times in the Hebrew Bible, and its
general meaning is quite simply, “here I am.” Although it often appears as though it is an
ordinary response in ordinary circumstances, it is the response that Abraham gives when
God calls upon him to sacrifice Isaac, and subsequently when the angel calls upon him
not to do so. The word is indicative of a profound response to God, a response that
signifies my willingness to serve absolutely and without question. It is at this depth and at
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this level of intensity, that Levinas wishes us to contemplate my response to the Other as
a response that, as it were, cuts across vision and totality. My response is fully accepting
of my responsibility towards the Other, without regard to the response of the Other. The
Other does not need to reply with reciprocity to me, and it is irrelevant whether or not he
or she does so.317 Such a response on the part of the Other is not my concern, since this is
not a reciprocal transaction between equals. Rather, it is an asymmetrical relationship
against which I am powerless to protest. It is an exchange at which I always arrive late;
the Other always arrives before me with her call, and in my response I am always already
late. My consciousness is afflicted by this imbalance, in spite of my wishes to the
contrary, and it is this additional element to which Levinas refers when he speaks of
persecution. It is this persecution that is also a kind of solidarity with the Other, my
humanity, and his.318
Subjectivity, then, for Levinas, includes as an integral element of its composition,
the place of the irreducible Other. In order for it to be subjectivity in the fullest sense, the
Other must be present, and the Other must be a total stranger.319 The self is, as it were,
turned inside out and completely open to the influence of the Other over it, and in its very
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nature it is free to take on the burden of the Other.320 This is not done for the sake of
humiliating or degrading oneself, since suffering in and of itself does not atone for or
expiate the wrongs that the self faces from the Other.321 Ego by its very nature cannot
sacrifice itself in any case, since that would be against the nature of ego.322 The self is
prepared to take on the responsibility of the entire universe and everyone in it.323 Yet, this
is not human sacrifice either. A person is not permitted to conduct human sacrifice, and
that extremity is not asked of or expected of the subject. So, the question remains: what is
this taking of responsibility if it is not sacrifice or atonement? Levinas explains:
To be a ‘self’ is to be responsible before having done anything. It is in this
sense to substitute oneself for others. In no way does this represent
servitude, for the distinction between master and slave already assumes a
pre-established ego. To say that subjectivity begins in the person, that the
person begins in freedom, that freedom is the primary causality, is to blind
oneself to the secret of the self and its relation to the past. This relation
does not amount to placing oneself at the beginning of this past so as to be
responsible within the strict limits of intention, nor to being the simple
result of the past. All the suffering and failure of the world weighs on that
point where a singling out occurs, an inversion of being’s essence. A point
is subject to everything. The impossibility of slipping away is the very
singling out of the subject.324
We experience the Other both in space and in time. We experience the Other in
space as what Levinas described as silhouettes, and in time we experience the Other as a
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multiplicity in the past, present, and future.325 Taking into account the fact that I am
always late in my meeting with the Other, it must include taking place in time and in
futurity, or else it would not be all-inclusive of the multiple elements that make up full
subjectivity. It is not what we might ordinarily think of as consciousness either in the
Cartesian or in the phenomenological sense. In other words, it is not Cartesian, in that
there is not a mind separate from the body. It is not phenomenological, in that
phenomenology argues that at the central axis of its composition, consciousness dwells
within me, although it is open to the world, and radiates outward from me to include the
world. It is, in this way, that Levinas also refers to the self, in the totality of being
including the Other, as finding itself, losing itself, and finding itself again, obviously
through interacting with the Other.326
Though my experience of the Other may take place in space and time, and
elements thereof be consciously experienced by me, I cannot put myself in any manner
ahead of the Other in this conscious experience. That is, I cannot say I met so-and-so and
saw so-and-so and talked with so-and-so and felt a certain way, given that I met so-andso. This is the case because consciousness can only be described as signified in its self.
That is, consciousness is my meeting of the Other in such a manner that I am called into
question before I meet the Other, and indeed before I act in any manner or interact with
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the Other.327 Like being in the world, consciousness includes the Other and includes the
impact of the Other upon me. In the same way that we are always already in the world,
according to the phenomenologists and Gestalt thinkers, we are always already
overwhelmed by meeting the Other, and unable to define, categorize, thematize, or
contain her Otherness – her alterity – in any way (including a containing by seeing), the
presence of my standing before the Other and looking at him or her.328 I can never place
the person with whom I am interacting below me in any description or thought, nor can I
say I saw that person, and acted accordingly, because it is not my choice to act upon what
I see, as if I had arrived at the meeting beforehand, because my meeting with the Other is
already superseded by the Other’s Otherness, rendering me in a subordinate role.
The Other is outside of me, which is why I cannot reduce this consciousness to a
level where it can be broken down or understood.329 Levinas deliberately speaks of this
interplay as being beyond vision because vision is a means through which one
thematizes, and categorizes what one sees, in the manner of “I saw.”330 I cannot place
myself first in any manner in this exchange. I cannot say I saw even if I did see the Other
before the Other sees me. This is a relationship that is beyond seeing itself. That is why
my obligation is infinite and why I am hostage to the demands of the Other. My only
response that is in any way honest is ‘hineni.’ Yet, in the face of all this, I cannot break
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down the Other into an experience that I experience, where I am overwhelmed by these
forces by guilt, or by fear. This simply is the nature of reality, improperly defined by
Western ontology throughout its history.
Levinas does not say anywhere that one should be blinded, or ignore the visible,
but that the ethical truth of the Other (and of myself) cannot be conveyed by way of the
visible. Although blindness in and of itself is not an escape from this paradigm, it does
seem that the relation between the self and the Other is the same on this approach
regardless of whether or not the self in question is blind. The blind viewer is here given
an equal – if not improved –means through which to encounter the call of the Other and,
as such, the self. When I am confronted by the Other the potential exists for me to reply
in a manner closer to truth, because of the elevation of speech in my experience. For
Levinas the relationship to the Other is separate from vision in the first place. It is for this
reason that Levinas’ ethical metaphysics—his overcoming of ontology in his reminder
that “ethics is first philosophy”—equalizes the experience of the blind and sighted
subject.
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CHAPTER 5: OBSERVATIONS OF A BLIND PHENOMENOLOGIST
Why, then, is ocularcentrism bad, or if not bad why is there a problem? Can we
not simply acknowledge that philosophy is ocularcentric, and leave it at that? Why must
we challenge ocularcentrism in the first place? We could simply moderate ocularcentrism
and leave things as they were. What is the problem with acknowledging that most people
experience and value their vision as their highest and most important sense? Is there a
way out of ocularcentrism that is reasonable? Is there an alternative? If there is another
way of "looking" at the world through our metaphysical senses, is that view closer to the
truth if it is not ocularcentric? Is that view closer to the truth if it is not ontological? What
is the truth? Is there a bigger truth to be gained? In this era of postmodernity and
suspicion of grand narratives, are these even the right questions to be asking? Is it a
pointless exploration? Is there ontological or metaphysical significance because of the
differences of worldviews, or of experiences of reality between blind and non-blind
persons? Can I practice philosophy blind, without being ocularcentric, from a point of
view that does not require vision at all?
This work is only a prologue. I have arrived at a few conclusions, and I will share
them. But, I do not consider most of my conclusions to be answers to any of these
questions. It may be that many of these questions still do not and never will have
answers, but there is continued value in discussing them, addressing them, and
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confronting them. Ultimately, the question of why ocularcentrism is negative and why it
should be challenged has an answer.
As philosophers and as cultural theorists, we should attempt to engage in
meaningful study and philosophizing in ways that are not ocularcentric, not arbitrarily
limited to a visual perspective. My questioning of ocularcentrism in phenomenology has
led me to arrive at additional, potentially very challenging, conclusions. They could even
suggest reforming philosophy entirely along new principles. The entire system and its
whole apparatus need to be questioned and challenged. I am, perhaps quite surprisingly,
not in favor of erasing ocularcentrism or overthrowing it or negating it. I am in favor of
strongly challenging the ocularcentric discourse and questioning it. That is what I have
endeavored to do in this study.
In philosophy or in metaphysical inquiries, the concepts being discussed and
examined must be universal, or as close to being universal as is conceivably possible. In
one sense, from my phenomenological experience, I cannot claim that many of my
experiences intertwined with blindness or vision can be classified as universal. A
majority of people whose vision functions perfectly, if they base their phenomenology
upon their well-functioning vision, can claim their experience as universal because they
can all see. But blind people are unique, and their experiences of vision loss or lack of
vision have different contexts. Although I may draw from my personal experience, my
goal is to surpass that limiting factor, to try to find what is universal about my
phenomenological experiences that I share with all humanity. The most obvious element
that I share with all humankind is the fact that I am conscious and alive in the first place.
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As Jonas pointed out in his book, The Phenomenon of Life, how is it that some
matter is nonliving or dead, and that matter which makes up human beings is conscious?
That I am a living being that has meaningful and unique perceptual experiences is a thing
to be wondered at. Phenomenology requires and asks that we go back to the things in
themselves. At the bedrock level of things in themselves is the conscious perceiving
being, and the intentional relation between that being and the object perceived. Each
experience that a person has is meaningful in context with:
a. The other experiences that the person has had or will have.
b. The other people with whom that person shares his or her life, and competing
expectations, goals, and obligations upon that person.
c. The experience linked to that person's emotions and the so called “inner
landscape” that makes up an unseen portion of the world.
I have spoken of several different phenomenological theories and interpretations
in this study. I come away from it with several concepts that I have solidified in my mind
as a direct result of working through this topic. I have come to accept what Levinas
argues, that I am responsible for the Other without necessarily feeling it, and that
responsibility and the Other’s alterity is what determines my subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty
did not see alterity the way Levinas did. Merleau-Ponty had no intention of creating an
ethical system like Levinas. The concept of flesh eliminates the subject. It may be said
that Merleau-Ponty found a means of refuting the subject/object dichotomy.
The metaphysical implications of my responsibility are potentially far-reaching
and extraordinary. Consider that we are intertwined in such a way that even when my
131

actions feel like they are my actions, those actions are a result of my obligation to the
infinite Other. Even in our natural day-to-day lives, there are elements of our experiences
that suggest this condition is possible. For example, I am spending and have spent days
alone in a room writing this document. What could be more my own then my thoughts
and my words? Is there a more independent state to be dwelling in than to be by oneself
absorbed in contemplation? From whom do I receive the words that I am using? Have I
chosen freely and independently to spend these days in front of a computer? There are
requirements I need to fulfill. I did not determine those requirements. My thoughts that
seem so much my own and independent of others are drawn from the works of others,
these philosophers I have studied in this dissertation. Can there be such a thing as an
independent thought that originates with you? The origin is the Other even in natural life.
The entanglement of obligations in natural life is a result of my obligations to the Other.
Levinas identifies the "after you, sir" as a phenomenon that demonstrates the
alterity of the Other, and along with it the obligation into which I am called by the face of
the Other. If there were not such entanglements and obligations (whether felt or unfelt),
then the “after you, sir” could not happen. It would not and it could not happen. But it
does. If this is so, can we truly speak of the freedom of will? Can we truly hold on to the
Cartesian separation and dualism? All dichotomies may be challenged by this
phenomenological methodology.
I am against ocularcentrism that implicitly devalues my perspective and my
phenomenological reality. Ocularcentrism limits philosophy. Who decides that the visual
is the best place to begin analyzing experience from a phenomenological perspective? In
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the case of a blind person, phenomenologically, the ability to cope with the world is
changed, in that one would need to adapt to work around not seeing. Schneider very
definitely lacks certain capacities and these lacks prevent his full connection with the
world. Merleau-Ponty may have included the blind person in such an assessment also,
since touch is inferior to sight. Schneider’s disabilities are much more severe to the point
where he cannot do certain things that I am not prevented from doing by blindness. Is
vision so valuable, then, that without it, philosophy is impossible?
Ocularcentrism implicitly places value judgments suggesting that vision or the
ability to see is ideal or an important part of the ideal perspective for interrogating and
arriving at phenomenological truth.
For my friend who was born blind he had no experience or concept that he was
missing his vision. He could not see. But he did not feel as though he were missing his
vision. From a phenomenological standpoint, we have to accept that his life world is
complete. We cannot allow our natural or common everyday prejudices to obfuscate our
judgment when doing metaphysical or phenomenological inquiries. And, by “prejudice” I
am not using the word in terms of political prejudice or prejudice driven by hatred. I am
using the word in the meaning of favoring my own perspective over that of others; it is
unconscious for us to favor our own perspective.
I will try to give another example: I cannot play the piano. That is an ability I do
not have. I am blind and I walk by a piano, and may never know the piano was present. It
does not matter. If you restored my vision, and I looked and saw the piano, I might
register that the object exists. I might be aware that the instrument sounds beautiful if
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someone else plays it. But, in as far as my capacities are concerned, from a
phenomenological standpoint, whether or not I see the piano makes no difference. I
cannot play it. If we are talking about egalitarianism, which I am not in this case, it would
be a different philosophical inquiry that I present to you. Then, it would be social critique
or political philosophy. In this case, it is neither. It may include the idea that dignity
should be afforded to all human beings. It may include the concept that all people should
be treated equally well by society. It may allow for the idea that everybody in a given
society should be supported, encouraged, and allowed to reach their fullest potential. But,
my anti-ocularcentric inquiry is not driven by the desire for equal rights. My inquiry is
not driven by a wish to supersede the ocularcentric phenomenological discourse with my
particular phenomenological reality. I do not seek to overthrow ocularcentrism. I do seek
to challenge it.
Ultimately, the challenge is not even against ocularcentrism itself. I challenge the
arbitrariness of ocularcentrism. In Schneider’s case, there are actions he cannot do. Those
incapacities far exceed my inability to see. I am prevented from seeing, which is a bodily
action. But, Schneider is prevented from doing certain actions, and from perceiving
aspects of his environment, i.e., his doctor’s house. If I walk by that piano that I cannot
see, I am not incapable of learning the piano is there. I am not incapable of learning how
to play it. Very likely, Schneider is incapable. If we use Levinas’s ethical metaphysics, as
opposed to phenomenology, there is no need to begin asking such value questions as
these. The value of an individual does not begin and end with their abilities or
disabilities. We are all incapable of experiencing the Other’s alterity, yet we are all
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beholden to our responsibilities toward the Other. Are we equally disabled in this case?
My physical blindness does not prevent me from fulfilling my responsibility toward the
Other, or cause me to fail at it. If my abilities or disabilities are not required, then neither
is ocularcentrism.
Levinas’ thought insists that we change our first philosophy from ontology to
ethics. It does not tell us to build a better or newer or fairer ethical system. It presents us
with a dynamic view of what constitutes an individual human being, and it allows us to
open the possibility that ontology can be questioned. In my case, I question an
ontological ocularcentrism. The two are inextricably linked. It may be that others will
argue against my point, suggesting that ocularcentrism is not a guiding principle of
philosophical inquiry. It might be argued that ocularcentrism does not stand alone as a
paradigm. I would still insist otherwise. There has always been an anti-ocularcentric
current in Western thought and, since the beginning of the 20th century, there has been a
very powerful anti-ocularcentric movement in philosophy. But, I do not see that
reactionary anti-ocularcentric movement as being truly anti-ocularcentric. In its spirit, it
is still trapped in a system of thought where vision remains important, either as
ocularcentrism, or as the absence of sight. It is still beholden to ocularcentrism. Instead, I
am suggesting that we start our inquiries from a different perspective that excludes
ocularcentric-ontological discourse. I am arguing against the unconscious bias and the
almost clichéd grasping at ocularcentric tendencies that phenomenologists seem to
express.
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Levinas himself also argued against ocularcentrism. He recognized that there
were potential repercussions and potential biases of arguing from an ocularcentric
perspective. I maintain that he recognized that when ontological arguments rely on
ocularcentric discourse, there is, metaphorically speaking, a dynamic of “oppression”
being expressed. I do not expect he had blind phenomenologists in mind. Had the point
been brought up to him, however, perhaps he would have agreed with my questioning of
ocularcentrism. What he identified is the objectification or reduction of human beings
that occurs when ontology directs its gaze at the world. The intellectual gaze exemplifies
grasping, controlling, and the achievement of mastery. In the case of the Other, when this
type of gaze is directed at the Other, alterity is ignored and the ego is elevated as a kind
of first-person perspective. This first-person perspective elevates the “I” and what I have,
or what I see, or what I understand. This sort of paradigm might as well bring us all the
way back to Descartes, saying that the most reliable and graspable knowledge that proves
my existence is in fact after all the I think. We may as well remain Cartesian.
*
There are many topics in this dissertation that I have barely touched upon. I would
like to devote additional research to them in the future. A few of these topics are:
1. In terms of ocularcentrism, can we more clearly define the role that metaphor
plays in creating a concept? Is there a connection between the two? Can we separate
metaphor from phenomenological discussions of reality?
2. Is it possible to conclusively determine whether or not Merleau-Ponty thought
that disability unquestionably diminishes a person’s actual being in the world? Because
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he seems to argue strongly for either case, it is difficult to definitively determine his
conclusions on the issue. There is evidence to suggest that he did see disability as
diminishing a person's connection to the world, their being in it, or even the
phenomenological validity of their perceptions. He never stated that view explicitly,
however. The changes that he initiated in, The Visible and The Invisible suggest that he
might have evolved beyond such a narrow perspective.
3. Having barely touched on Levinas’ thought, although it would be a tangential
journey, I would like to research the influence on his ideas of Kabbalistic thought, if any.
Is there any evidence or potential that Levinas was influenced by Lurianic Kabbalah?
Could he have been influenced by other aspects of Jewish mysticism? If so, does that in
any way effect or diminish the rational validity of his philosophy?
By way of conclusion, this short work suggests that we need not limit ourselves
because of an ocularcentric model of thought. I argue that there is no escape from
ocularcentrism through its negation directly. Attacking ocularcentric premises from
within ontology remains ocularcentric. Escaping ocularcentrism might be achievable
through the works and counter-phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas does not
defeat phenomenology by employing elements of its reverse and opposition. He still uses
a methodology based on a phenomenological framework. Yet, he succeeds in his counterphenomenology by changing the focus and purpose of the self from ontology to ethics.
His ideas open the way potentially to challenge counter-ocularcentrism. In his thought, it
is not relevant whether I can or cannot see. There still is room to accept the validity of my
perceptions from my perspective, but as a result of replacing ontology with ethics as first
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philosophy, my purpose is not to control and acquire all that I see. It is not a hindrance if
I cannot see in this case. My purpose is to acknowledge the command of the face of the
other, even if I do not feel its effects upon me. In the same way that Levinas escapes
ontology, I can also propose an escape from ocularcentrism.
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